02/06/02 - Adam's 02/02 example of three equalcandidates:

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Ingles wrote-

And then there's the situation where almost all of the voters are better
off voting for the lesser-evil (when there is a near-tie between the two
extreme candidates):

              --utility/rating--
      100                50                   0
      -----------------------------------------
45     A            B                         C
 5     B                 A                    C
 1     B                 C                    A
49     C            B                         A

A and C are in a dead heat, so that they can't predict whether their
favorite, or least favorite, will win.  They are both better off ranking
B first, rather than gambling on the outcome.  So 94% of the voters in
this election are better off ranking insincerely.
----
D- I must mention again that any 2nd or later choice vote is (or should be) 
done on the condition that it does NOT hurt an earlier choice vote --- 
related to the divided majority situation.

Thus, the math should be--

              --utility/rating--
      100                50                   0
      -----------------------------------------
40     A            B                         C

5     A            B                         C
 5     B                 A                    C

 1     B                 C                    A
 1     C            B                         A

48    C            B                         A

Thus B is a compromise with the 40 + 48 sincere (?) votes (with no special 
need to move B to first by the A and C folks).  

I note that both A and C have 50 last place votes each.

B also happens to be a Condorcet winner.