02/06/02 - Adam's 02/02 example of three equal candidates:

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Adam wrote in part-

 Example: if a majority prefers candidate A to all others, can they make sure 
candidate A wins?
---
D- Of course. 

Vote YES for A and NO for every other choice.  

A wins.

In reality land --- as with the left(er)/ right(er) wings of both the 
Democrats/ Republicans --- there may not be a simple YES majority for only 
one choice.

Thus --- the divided majority problem, sincere/ insincere  desired/ 
compromise votes (especially for 2nd or later choices) and the various 
strategies connected with any particular method to resolve such problem.

FFrom election-methods-list-request at eskimo.com  Wed Feb  6 18:01:16 2002
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  MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

>
> Your standard, you once said, is to elect the candidate most likely
> to be the absolute best. But most would probably agree that there's
> no such thing as the best candidate, in an absolute sense. Some
> candidates are best for some people, other candidates are best for
> other people. Looking for the candidate most likely to be the
> absolute best, you're chasing an apparition. 

You haven't actually brought out an argument in favour of your position. 
 The fact that there exist candidates that are best for some people 
isn't in dispute and doesn't address the issue.

Imagine an island where two men have fallen into a dispute.  Each man's 
position is better for him, in that it is in his narrowly defined 
self-interest.  Is it possible to say that one position is right?  It's 
pretty hard to maintain that there is no dispute they could have where 
one position is in the right.  For example, if one man decided he should 
be allowed to eat the other man, not because of starvation, but just 
taste.  I think it would be hard to argue that both positions are best 
for the individual, and that's all that can be said.  If each wanted to 
be Island President, we would have to conclude that there is an absolute 
best choice.

But if you acknowledge an absolute best option in this case, then 
presumably you believe there can be best candidates.  You could say that 
this is a rare occurrence.  But on what grounds?  I think you'll find 
that an even more precarious position to take.

The second problem with your position is that all our arguments are 
predicated on there being a right answer.  I mean, plurality is best for 
the current government.  Maybe it isn't best for anyone else, although 
that seems implausible.  But unless we are willing to say that one side 
*should* prevail, we can't make any recommendations.  In fact, for those 
cases where there is no absolute best candidate, I don't see how it can 
matter who wins.  Presumably different candidates are better for 
different people, but there is no candidate who we can say *should* win. 
 If there were, he or she would be the absolute best choice.

---
Blake Cretney



rom election-methods-list-request at eskimo.com  Wed Feb  6 18:01:18 2002
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  Forest Simmons wrote:

>
>On Mon, 4 Feb 2002, Blake Cretney wrote:
>
>>  Joe Weinstein wrote:
>>
>>>As a citizen and voter, I don't want the election method to give 
>>>gratuitous incentive to CAMPAIGN strategies which aim to confuse and 
>>>entrap voters, e.g. thru introduction of incontestable fallacious poll 
>>>data or of extra clones (pro or maybe con a given position).
>>>
>>>But I do have a VOTING strategy.  My strategy has me vote (or abstain) 
>>>so as to maximize my expected overall satisfaction - call it 
>>>'utility'.  Ingredients which enter into this utility include:  how, 
>>>apparently, my vote would most likely (or thereafter profitably) make 
>>>a difference in picking the winner (instrumental effect);  how my vote 
>>>would most likely (or profitably) bear weight as an expression of 
>>>sentiment;  my costs in time and money to go and cast the vote; my 
>>>regret and losses in self- or others' respect from not voting or from 
>>>voting 'insincerely'; etc.
>>>
>>>I not only have a VOTING strategy:  I am in fact ENTITLED to conceive 
>>>a
>>>nd have and use such a strategy.  Indeed I DEMAND that the election 
>>>method give me scope for effective strategy.  (A decent respect for 
>>>democracy requires me to concede the same rights to other voters too.)
>>>
>>The more a voting system allows effective strategy, the more it allows 
>>those who understand the system to get more power than those who do not. 
>> This may be a necessary evil, but it surprises me that you seem to feel 
>>this is actually desirable.
>>
>
>The source of your misunderstanding is that Joe and I use the word
>"strategy" inclusively, i.e. to include sincere strategy.  If the optimal
>strategy for a method is to vote sincerely, then so much the better.
>
Well, I can't tell anymore whether we disagree or not.  Here's my point. 
 If some people are able to get more influence by a greater 
understanding of the method, or better guesses about how other's are 
voting, I say that is a bad thing, although to some extent inevitable. 
 Some people would say that the better informed have a right to whatever 
greater influence they can get, and it would be wrong to frustrate this 
natural process.  Others would argue that the only important thing is 
that the "right" candidate wins (possibly the sincere Condorcet winner), 
so strategy is only good or bad in so far as it helps or frustrates that 
goal.

But I say that although other goals may be important too, the 
possibility that some voters can get a better outcome by outhinking the 
rest of the electorate is a bad thing in and of itself, as it frustrates 
the goal of equal influence.  It is also bad because the result may be 
less stable, as it can change without a change of opinion.  As far as I 
can see, this is the position taken by those much-despised academics.

So, what say you?  Is strategy as I think of it (voting based on extra 
information) a good thing or a bad thing or neutral.  And if you start 
by saying that all voting is strategic, I'm not going to respond ;-)

---
Blake Cretney