[EM] Sincerity for criteria, Blake

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

I'd said:

>That's why I defined "sincere voting", for the purpose of my
>criteria that refer to sincere voting.
>
>When it's defined, it's obvious.

Your definition may well be clear and easy to apply. I don't remember
your definition.

I reply:

Here it is:

A voter votes sincerely iff he doesn't reverse a sincere preference
or fail to vote a sincere preference that the balloting system
in use would have allowed him to vote in addition to the
preferences that he actually did vote.

[end of definition]

I define reversing or voting a sincere preference in the obvious
ways.

Blake continues:

My point is that it isn't obvious that it is the
single correct definition of sincerity, since there are multiple
positions on this subject (and not just mine and yours).

I reply:

Of course not. My "sincere" is sincere & complete. Some don't
think complete voting should be required for sincere voting, and
they're right, but, for the purposes of my criteria, it's desirable
to require complete voting too, and it makes sense to do so. Strictly
speaking, I should call it "sincere & complete voting".

As already mentioned, it seems to me that Nurmi defines sincere
Approval voting as voting (only) for the candidates that one
actually approves of. That makes sense, especially if we use
acceptable/unacceptable instead of approved of/not approved of.

What's wrong with their being several different definitions of
sincere voting, as long as I can show that my definition for
criteria is the one that's meaningful for criteria? Nurmi's definition
isn't realistic enough to base criteria on it, since many won't
vote Nurmi-sincerely in Approval.

Blake continues:

It's perfectly reasonable for you define sincerity or CC your own way.
But then you have to explain why these definitions reveal the truth
about plurality. Perhaps you have a great argument to that effect. But
I think it would be simpler just to argue why plurality or approval
isn't acceptable to Condorcet advocates, without having to go into all
these new definitions.

I reply:

Criteria are the way to say something definite about what a voting
system will or won't do. It's very convenient for criteria to
apply across the board. My CC goes right to the heart of why
Plurality isn't acceptable to Condorcet advocates. It fails my
CC for the same reason that Condorcet advocates don't like it.

I'm not sure what you mean by "reveal the truth about Plurality".
The only truth about Plurality that my CC speaks of is that
even if everyone votes sincerely, a sincere CC can lose.

I re-emphasize that I don't consider CC to be important for
public elections. It seems to work well for us in our EM polls,
but I expect significant amounts of insincere voting in public
elections.

You speak of the difficulty in arguing to justify my definition
of sincere voting, for the purpose of criteria. It's obvious to anyone
that reversing a sincere preference isn't sincere.

As for the other requirement in my definition, the person who
doesn't meet that requirement is someone who obviously could be
doing more than he's doing to vote his preferences.

So when a criterion requires that a certain outcome happen or
not happen if some or all voters vote sincerely, it's saying that
that desirable result will happen if those voters don't avoidably
leave preferences unvoted and don't reverse preferences.

That's so natural a stipulation for criteria that guarantee a
certain result  that I don't quite
understand why you (Blake) believe that it would be difficult to
justify.

Blake continues:

I assumed that you would want to defend your criteria and definition.
That makes the explanation more complicated (or at least longer).

I reply:

It doesn't make the criteria definitions longer, but it makes
it necessary to have the supporting definition, the sincerity
definition ready, or written below for those who want it.
But, for those who are interested enough to want to read it,
it won't be too complicated.

Blake continues:

Maybe there are people who are so in awe of mathematics that when you
prove that a particular definition (of your own design) applies, they
feel that you have proven your point. If I define the "Great Method
Criterion" and prove that Ranked Pairs passes it, they will take it as
proven that Ranked Pairs is a great method.

I reply:

I use a number of criteria that aren't of my own design. But
I use some that are of my own design too. I never ask people
to value a criterion just because I wrote it. My criteria are
mostly lesser-of-2-evils criteria, and it doesn't take any
convincing for most people to accept the importance of the
lesser-of-2-evils problem. The relevance of my defensive
strategy criteria to the lesser-of-2-evils problem is so obvious
as to not require any argument.

The difference between your standard and mine, Blake, is that
mine is one that's shared by lots of people who express concern
about its violation. Lots of voters and reform advocates
express concern about the lesser-of-2-evils problem. It's recognized
to be the one big thing wrong with Plurality.

Mike Ossipoff





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