[EM] Re: The Allure of IRV

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Richard wrote in part-

So, let's say you have an election in which two sets of ballots are taken
simultaneously: one ranked set, and one approval set. The ranked ballots
are counted to find the CW, and the approval ballots are counted to find
the AW. If CW and AW are the same, then neither method has bested the
other. If CW and AW are different, then...

1) there is a majority N1 of voters who prefer CW to AW. Some of these
will have approved of CW and disapproved of AW; call this number N1A.

2) there is a minority N2 of voters who prefer AW to CW. Call the number
of voters within this group that approved of AW and disapproved of CW
N2A.

For simplicity I'll assume nobody voted any tied preferences between
AW and CW.

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D- One absolute scale is plus 100 percent to minus 100 percent.

Approved (Acceptable) group --- none, 1 or more  --- A (awesome) group

Compromise group ---  none, 1 or more  --- C (average) group

Unapproved (Unacceptable) group --- none, 1 or more --- F (flunk) group

A question is the percentage for the dividing line between the 3 groups.

Since Condorcet uses *relative* votes and Approval uses *absolute* votes, the 
comparing of the two methods is somewhat like comparing standard apples and 
standard oranges (or other dissimilar things -- NOT technically proper).

I bring up the now ancient notion ---  when issues are on the ballot there 
are YES or NO votes.

How come there are not YES or NO votes (or perhaps even *MAYBE*) for 
candidates -- let us guess.

Thus ---  a possible combined letter-number method (at least in computerized 
voting systems) ???

A1, A2, A3 etc.

C1, C2, C3, etc.

F1, F2, F3, etc.

If a choice fails to get A group plus C group votes equal to a majority, then 
it flunks.

As usual -- a minority in the single winner case may be unhappy since its A 
choices may NOT (and should NOT) be elected.

Thus -- such minority *may* want to vote for 1 or more compromise (group C) 
choices-- otherwise the legislative body may have to fill any vacancy (if 
there is a popular vote majority requirement).

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