[EM] Doubts on Approval Strategy

Rob Lanphier robla at eskimo.com
Mon Apr 29 00:46:51 PDT 2002


Hi all,

I've been somewhat following the various "approval strategy" threads, and
I'm still a little skeptical.  In addition to the three-way problem that
Richard Moore points out, I think a more troubling problem will be in
getting good polling data.

When asked in some NYTimes/ABC/Disney/WorldCom poll about what they
approve, I suspect most people will tend toward only approving the
candidates they really like.  The question itself will make a huge
difference: "who do you approve of?" is very different than "who will you
mark on your ballot?". Even asking the right question, though, there's no
telling what strategy they'll employ once they get in the voting booth. 

At first, the accuracy of the polling numbers will be an issue because of
general confusion about their significance.  However, once that issue gets
ironed out, there's a more incidious problem: the motivation to lie in the
pre-election polls.

Let's assume a simple left-right spectrum, with candidates A, B, C, and D
(far left to far right).  Let's also say that candidates B wins in a world
where there's accurate data, and everyone votes according to expected
strategy (where "B" and "C" are the only candidates who get or come close
to getting majority approval). However, let's say that A has pretty strong
support, with about 30% of the electorate wanting A as a first choice.

Now we've got an interesting problem.  Prior to the election, "A" 
supporters may not want to tip their hands that they'd settle for "B", in
hopes that "A" can be considered the "front-runner" candidate that "B"
voters should also approve.  So, when asked by the pollsters, they "lie",
saying that they only approve "A". 

So, perhaps what happens at this point is now "A" pulls ahead in the
pre-election polls, where "A" has the highest approval rating, at 30%, and
"B" only has 28% (for instance).  Does that mean "A" voters would never
vote for "B"?  Does that mean that "C" voters should perhaps adjust their
strategy and "approve" B?  Would "C" voters admit this to pollsters if
they knew?

I think the temptation to "lie" to pollsters for strategic reasons would
be pretty strong in a world where the polls matter so much.  What's more,
it wouldn't be lying at all, it may actually be sincere.  The strategic
calculus is a little too much for me, and I suspect it'd be pretty
baffling to the public.  Just like in first-past-the-post, I think that
some norms would evolve around Approval; what I'm not sure of is whether
they'd be an improvement over current conditions.

Rob



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