[EM] Approval Strategy (was the Allure of IRV)

[Alex Small]

Adam wrote:

>The simple strategy that works fairly well is to vote for your favorite of
>the front-runners (just as you would in lone mark plurality), and also
>vote for any candidate you like more than that one.

I concur in most cases.  However, sometimes there are true 3-way contests.
This doesn't happen much with plurality, but I suspect that implementing
Approval would lead to some strong third and fourth (and maybe more?)
options emerging.  In that case voting for your favorite of the front-
runners may not be best.  You may also want to vote for your second
favorite.

(A classic 3-way race was the 1998 gubernatorial race in Minnesota.
Ventura, the Dem, and Repubiican were all in the vicinity of 30%.)

My strategy is roughly equivalent to voting for all candidates above the
average utility, but I put it in more intuitive terms:

Which will you regret more:  Seeing your lesser evil narrowly beat your
favorite, or seeing your least favorite narrowly beat your lesser evil?  If
the worst would be an unmitigated disaster, then hedge your bets and also
vote for the lesser evil.  If the lesser evil is still a step in the wrong
direction then only vote for favorite.  Likewise, if you figure that even
the worst of the 3 will still avoid any major blunders then only vote for
favorite.

Alex

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