[EM] Forest's 3-bit approval method

Alex Small asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Sat Apr 27 17:44:30 PDT 2002


I like it!!!!!!!!

It would give greater security to voters afraid to "dilute" their vote for
favorite, which many novices think is an advantage of IRVIt is more
conducive to majoritarian principles, which IRV promoters often talk
about.  Also, because voters would have less fear of "diluting" their vote
for favorite it would encourage cross-over voting, which once again helps
centrists.

I might actually like this better than Condorcet, due to its relative
simplicity.  As Joe pointed out, if Condorcet were adopted there would
still be an argument over the completion method, and although most people
on this list are convinced that one or another method is ideal, most of our
evaluations get technical.  I don't know how well that would go over in a
policy debate.

I would suggest a minor modification, however:

Let people indicate more than one preferred choice, so that in the presence
of (perceived) clones voters could put both clones number 1.  Simply put
three ratings on the ballot:  Preferred, Approved, Disapproved.  If more
than one person is rated "Preferred" by a majority the one with the
most "preferred" votes wins.  If nobody is "preferred" by a majority then
do just as Forest suggested:  Whoever has the fewest "disapproved" votes
(or, equivalently, the most approved plus preferred) wins.

Finally, the increase in expense/complexity should be minimal.  In my area,
as long as the machines can read paper ballots with three circles next to
each name there should be no need to buy new machines.

Alex

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