equilibria

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Blake said:

So, since a majority of voters
are still voting for X first, X still wins, since we are using an M
class method. Therefore, this (and every) sincere CW is the winner for
some electoral equilibrium.

I reply:

Maybe, but the fact remains that with RP(m), and the other
margins methods, there are ordinary, typical situations
(configurations of candidates, voters, and voters' preferences)
in which those methods' only equilibria are ones in which many
voters are burying their favorite by voting a compromise over him/her.

With Approval, in every situation where there's a CW, there's an
equilibrium in which the CW wins and no one order-reverses.

In wv, that's true if we stipulate that no one is indifferent between
the CW and any other candidate. Of course in practice, it would
take a considerable number of indifferent voters to make the
previous paragraph's statement not be true of wv.

Mike Ossipoff


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