[EM] falsifying voters' rankings--no.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Michael Rouse said:

Here is an idea to prevent strategic truncation and ties

I reply:

Strategic truncation, defensive truncation, is what deters order-reversal in 
the wv methods. It's what prevents the election from
having the order-reversal problem that Margins has.

Rouse continues:

Let's assume the following:

1. Voters have no preference between candidates they truncate or tie

I reply:

Not a good assumption. With wv, people can have good reason to truncate
even when not indifferent. It avoids the need for more drastically
misrepresenting their preferences. It avoids the need for burying
their favorite as a defensive strategy, as they must do in all
of Margins' equilibria, in many common, ordinary situations.

Rouse continues:

3. We get a net gain in social utility if we replace truncations and ties
with the order preferred by the majority of voters who expressed a
preference.

I reply:

You don't replace my ranking, the way I voted it, with anything.

You're suggesting modifying someone's ballot without their permission,
counting them as having ranked Smith over Jones, when they've ranked
neither. It isn't very democratic to count preferences that someone
didn't vote.

Of course, with Condorcet(margins) there'd be no reason not to to
what you suggest. But if you did it with Condorcet(wv), you'd
reduce Condorcet(wv) to the the merit-level of Condorcet(margins).

Mike Ossipoff



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