[EM] Equilibria of wv & margins

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Say there are 3 candidates: A,B, &C. They're on a 1-dimensional
political spectrum, and B is the sincere CW. I'll be more specific:

100: ABC
49:  BAC
75:  CBA

Voters who share the same favorite vote the same. Each such faction
is a player.

For simplicity, this is a complete-preference-info example.

If something less simple is desired, then I urge someone to do a
probability-info example, maybe with more candidates, maybe with
the favoriteness-groups divided into more player-factions.

With the winning-votes methods, there's an equilibrium in which
no one reverses a sincere preference and no one ranks a less-liked
candidate equal to someone who is included in their ranking.

With margins, the only equilibria are ones in which defensive
order-reversal is used.

If we disallow offensive order-reversal as a strategy, then
wv has an equilibrium in everyone sincerely ranks all of the
candidates.

Even if we disallow offensive order-reversal, margins' equilibria
still all include defensive equal-top-ranking (ranking a less-preferred
compromise equal to one's favorite).

Mike Ossipoff




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