[EM] Winning-votes intuitive?

[Dave Ketchum]

On Mon, 1 Apr 2002 01:04:43 EST DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:

> Adam wrote in part-
> 
> One final thought.  on 3/20 I posted a message about Approval Completed 
> Condorcet.  The idea was to use a graded ballot (ABCDEF, for example).  If 
> there was not a Condorcet winner, then the candidate with the most approval 
> votes (A's, B's, and C's in the case of ABCDEF ballots) wins the 
> election.  In my initial analysis, this method seemed at least as good as 
> the other Condorcet methods we like to discuss.  Furthermore, it seems like 
> it could be an easier method to pitch, since the cycle-breaker is VERY 
> intuitive.  So I guess what I'm asking is... does ACC render this whole 
> debate meaningless?  Just a thought.
> ---
> D- I noted ACMA long ago -
> 
> Approval
> Concorcet
> Most Approved tiebreaker (if no Condorcet winner).
> 
> Approval by itself is defective since it does not rank the Approved choices.
> 
> Condorcet by itself is defective since it does not indicate that a choice is 
> approved.


I choke on Adam's words for not adequately using the information Condorcet 
procedures develop; and do not see DEMOREP1 really offering a solution.


For example, just picking out the Smith set normally gets a tolerable 
length list of possible winners.  Usually there would be enough 
differences within the set to make a valid decision.

If the best that can be done with Condorcet data leaves a tie, then it 
matters little what is used as a tie breaker, provided it is reproducible 
(no human or computer going off in a corner and tossing a coin), so 
letting Approval pick among what have been identified as the possible 
winners would be acceptable.
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum    108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
              Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                    If you want peace, work for justice.