[EM] Fluffy the dog: rejection of Condorcet

[Craig Carey]

Perhaps this could be kept to the top that Mr Ketchum brought.

Mr Ketchum: to state a position you can post up the equations
that define when this Condorcet method you like, will find the
wrong number of winners. Is Condorcet like something you found
out of a garbage can?, or do you have principles that allow
you to algebraically/geometrically adjust a variant Condorcet
method all the way back to plain Condorcet. The pairwise
comparing idea is undesirable from the point of view of voters.
There are people subscribed that will say they like it. That
does not make pairwise comparing less of a stupid idea. You
got an argument about large recursive factions: seemed to
agree with it and without a show of logic have returned to
implying you like Condorcet. I won't ask what happens if I
repeat the argument.





At 01.09.05 04:19 -0400 Wednesday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
 >On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 23:21:57 -0700 Craig Carey wrote:
 >>
 >> At 01.09.04 16:40 -0400 Tuesday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
 >>  >On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 08:35:54 -0700 Craig Carey wrote, in part:
 >> ...
 >>  >This caught my eye so, thanks to eGroups/Yahoo, I could and did go back
 >>  >to this item in Nov. 00 archives:
 >>  >
 >>
 >> I was thinking of my repair to that Fluffy example.
 >>
 >>  >I do NOT see this as an indictment of Condorcet.  These voters ALL SAID
 >>
 >> Condorcet finds the wrong number of winners sometimes.
 >> Condorcet is able to be seen as already rejected.
 >
 >I do not understand these statements.
 >     All of these methods seem to be in the business of finding a single
 >winner, with the exception of an occasional tie.
 >     If Condorcet really fails, I am all ears.
 >>
 >> ...
 >>  >     Aside from the basement thought, I do not like anything that
 >>  >invites strategic voting.  For those who understand the strategy, it
 >>
 >> That could be similar to expecting monotonicity to be held.
 >>
 >> ...
 >>  >As to hundreds of candidates - how can any voter be expected to pick
 >>  >intelligently among such a crowd, regardless of method of counting votes?
 >>
 >> Post up the equations and I will have a look at them. Unless there is
 >> some problem with that (nonexistence?).
 >
 >In one sense, a good formula should continue to satisfy for any number
 >of candidates.
 >

And, let us guess, a best formula is one that finds the wrong number
of winners.

...
 >I like B winning, for every voter considers B to be acceptable, while
 >more than half declare each of A and C less acceptable.

The slopes of the boundaries ought be constrained or else the legal
rights of voters are harmed. Except what you like is a method so
inherently dumb that it is not used. You still have not provided exact
equations defining where all good 1 winner methods will find the wrong
number of winners. The audience will not follow Mr Ketchum if he will
suggest that the regions of simplices where a method must find the
wrong number of winners is so very obvious that no equations are
needed. Once the formula are posted into this list then I and others
can see if they are right from the point of view of a voter. One thing
that will be right to do is to reject comments like "I like B winning".


 >
 >Why am I supposed to care about First Past the Post, considering the above?
 >

I mentioned it and FPTP got the winners that an axiom of no harming of
the candidate voted for would lead to. Were you unaware of that?.

...


I presume I may not write further to messages from Mr Ketchum. None
of what has been written seems to have even a faint link with the
exact algebra of principles of preferential voting. What is the problem
over here?.