[EM] Fluffy the dog: rejection of Condorcet
davek at clarityconnect.com
Wed Sep 5 01:19:56 PDT 2001
On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 23:21:57 -0700 Craig Carey wrote:
> At 01.09.04 16:40 -0400 Tuesday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> >On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 08:35:54 -0700 Craig Carey wrote, in part:
> >This caught my eye so, thanks to eGroups/Yahoo, I could and did go back
> >to this item in Nov. 00 archives:
> I was thinking of my repair to that Fluffy example.
> >I do NOT see this as an indictment of Condorcet. These voters ALL SAID
> Condorcet finds the wrong number of winners sometimes.
> Condorcet is able to be seen as already rejected.
I do not understand these statements.
All of these methods seem to be in the business of finding a single
winner, with the exception of an occasional tie.
If Condorcet really fails, I am all ears.
> > Aside from the basement thought, I do not like anything that
> >invites strategic voting. For those who understand the strategy, it
> That could be similar to expecting monotonicity to be held.
> >As to hundreds of candidates - how can any voter be expected to pick
> >intelligently among such a crowd, regardless of method of counting votes?
> Post up the equations and I will have a look at them. Unless there is
> some problem with that (nonexistence?).
In one sense, a good formula should continue to satisfy for any number
In a second sense, if the formula fails after 100 candidates, and there
would never be more than 50, the formula is acceptable. We do have,
assuming the district is a whole state, need to consolidate results from
multiple precincts. Results tables quickly grow beyond manageability
for IRV; remain tolerable with Condorcet.
> > davek at clarityconnect.com http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
> > Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
> This original "Fluffy" example has such problems with its numbers that new
> numbers could be used and the original discarded. Here is an improved
> AB 48 : 1 winner (no. 1)
> B 3
> CB 49
> Condorcet: B wins : A:B = 48:52, B:C = 51:49, C:A = 49:48
> FPTP: C wins
> Candidate B wins, and: (1) the outcome is too different to First Past the
> Post to some, and (2) allowing that would lead into problems.
> Condorcet can be rejected for picking the wrong number of winners even
> without this example.
I like B winning, for every voter considers B to be acceptable, while
more than half declare each of A and C less acceptable.
Why am I supposed to care about First Past the Post, considering the above?
Why wrongly? Certainly it should not surprise if altering votes makes
> If Mr Layton writes, perhaps an 'improved' Fluffy the Dog example could
> be named.
> At 2000.11.13 12:05 +1100 Monday, LAYTON Craig wrote:
> >There is basically one cogent criticism of all Condorcet systems, of which
> >you're all aware; that it puts too much importance on middle preferences,
> >especially when not all candidates or parties are known to voters. Example:
> >In a two candidate race:
> >A 51
> >C 49
> >C wins
> A wins
> >A and C are diametrically opposed, there has been a long and dirty smear
> >campaign, so that C voters hate A and A voters hate C. My dog, fluffy (B),
> >joins the race at the last minute;
> >ABC 49
> >CBA 49
> >BAC 01
> >BCA 01
> A:B = 49:51, B:C = 51:49, C:A = 50:50
> >Fluffy is the Condorcet winner!.
And I am happy, for ALL the voters agree that B is acceptable, more than
half like B better than A, and more than half like B better than C.
That Fluffy may have had a misleading resume is not our problem.
davek at clarityconnect.com http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you
More information about the Election-Methods