[EM] Re: IRV is summable (a little)

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Tue Sep 4 20:53:15 PDT 2001


When I look I see an argument for Condorcet:
     On A vs B 70 prefer A while only 20 prefer B - strong anti B
     On A vs C 30 prefer A while 60 prefer C - weak pro C
     On B vs C 50 prefer B while 40 prefer C - real weak pro B.

So Consorcet Gives it to A and there should be less complaints than B or
C winning should inspire.

Dave Ketchum

On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 14:38:19 -0700 DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:
> 
> bmbuck at 14850.com wrote in part-
> 
> Using this method, doing an IRV election with three candidates and ballot
> tallies as follows:
> 
> 30 A>B>C
> 20 B>C>A
> 40 C>A>B
> 
> (standard IRC method: eliminate B, causing C to win 60 to 30).
> 
> ----
> D- As usual I ask ---
> 
> Does ANY choice have a YES majority  (46 YES) ???
> 
> If 2 or more choices have such YES majorities, then ---
> 
> does any choice beat each other choice ??
> if there is no such choice, then which choice has the most *YES* votes ???
> 
> Simple IRV is extremely defective since it only uses a part of a Place Votes
> Table.
> 
>       Place Votes
> 
>     1     2      3
> 
> A  30     40     20     90
> B  20     30     40     90
> C  40     20     30     90
> 
>    90     90     90
> 
> The underlying problem remains as usual --- divided majorities and possible
> insincere voting for the lesser of alleged evils.
> 
> M1   30
> M2   20
> Z    40
> 
> The M (majority) faction is divided, do some of the Z voters insincerely vote
> for M1 or M2 ???
> 
> Will the universe survive if there is some (or lots) of any such insincere
> voting ???
> 
> Does the sun rise in the east ???
> 
> Is it hot on the Equator at sea level ???

-- 
 davek at clarityconnect.com    http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum     108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
             Do to no one what you would not want done to you



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