[EM] Re: IRV is summable (a little)
davek at clarityconnect.com
Tue Sep 4 20:53:15 PDT 2001
When I look I see an argument for Condorcet:
On A vs B 70 prefer A while only 20 prefer B - strong anti B
On A vs C 30 prefer A while 60 prefer C - weak pro C
On B vs C 50 prefer B while 40 prefer C - real weak pro B.
So Consorcet Gives it to A and there should be less complaints than B or
C winning should inspire.
On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 14:38:19 -0700 DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:
> bmbuck at 14850.com wrote in part-
> Using this method, doing an IRV election with three candidates and ballot
> tallies as follows:
> 30 A>B>C
> 20 B>C>A
> 40 C>A>B
> (standard IRC method: eliminate B, causing C to win 60 to 30).
> D- As usual I ask ---
> Does ANY choice have a YES majority (46 YES) ???
> If 2 or more choices have such YES majorities, then ---
> does any choice beat each other choice ??
> if there is no such choice, then which choice has the most *YES* votes ???
> Simple IRV is extremely defective since it only uses a part of a Place Votes
> Place Votes
> 1 2 3
> A 30 40 20 90
> B 20 30 40 90
> C 40 20 30 90
> 90 90 90
> The underlying problem remains as usual --- divided majorities and possible
> insincere voting for the lesser of alleged evils.
> M1 30
> M2 20
> Z 40
> The M (majority) faction is divided, do some of the Z voters insincerely vote
> for M1 or M2 ???
> Will the universe survive if there is some (or lots) of any such insincere
> voting ???
> Does the sun rise in the east ???
> Is it hot on the Equator at sea level ???
davek at clarityconnect.com http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you
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