Consistency, Truncation, etc. (was CR ballots, etc.)

Bart Ingles bartman at
Fri Oct 5 23:08:24 PDT 2001

DEMOREP1 at wrote:
> fsimmons at wrote in part -
> What are the counter-intuitive results of Approval?
> ----
> D- A *real* first choice can lose (if rankings were being used).
> 48 A
> 3   AC
> 1   BC
> 48 C
> 100
> Approval
> A 51 (all *real* first choice votes)
> B 1
> C 52 (wins using simple Approval) (very unlikely but it can happen)

But you don't show why the AC voters would WANT to vote this way. 
Assuming the three voters prefer A to C, your example above is
equivalent to a ranked example where the same three rank A and C equal
in first place, for unknown reasons, and with the same result.

48 A    >  B=C
 3 A=C  >  B
 1 B=C  >  A
48 C    >  A=B

If the voters under either Approval or Condorcet wish to vote this way,
perhaps because they perceive B or some other unlisted candidate as more
of a threat, then I have no problem with this.  It's up to the
individual voters to weight the costs and benefits of any voting

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