Tyranny of the Majority

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Harper wrote in part-

I presume your "instability" problem is that, given the existance of a 
Sincere Condorcet Winner, if you elect someone who isn't the SCW, then a 
majority would prefer to replace the person who you elected with the 
SCW. However, a similar phenomenon can happen even if you elect the SCW. 
Consider ye olde low utility Condorcet example, which I'll repeat for 
the benefit of anyone who missed it the first thirty times:

100 A >> B > C
100 C >> B > A
1 B > A = C

Now a majority would prefer to replace B by throwing a coin and electing 
either A or C. So an election method which always elects the SCW is 
still unstable.
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D- I again suggest a simple YES or NO vote on each choice.

Who, if anybody, in the example could get a YES majority ???

Condorcet would be used on the YES majority choices.