[EM] Condorcet vs Approval

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

If you solve circular ties by Approval, where candidates whom you've
ranked get an Approval vote from you, then you have to worry about
strategy, how far to extend you ranking, even if there's no danger
of anyone using offensive order-reversal strategy. With Condorcet,
in the form of PC, Smith//PC, SSD, Cloneproof SSD, or BeatpathWinner,
a majority who prefer the sincere CW to B can be assured that B
can't win, if that majority vote sincerely and if no one falsifies
a preference. That can't be said for other methods. For SSD, Cloneproof SSD, 
& BeatpathWinner, a majority who prefer a certain
member of the sincere Smith set to B can be assured that B won't
win, if that majority votes sincerely, and if B isn't a member of
the sincere Smith set, and if no one falsifies a preference.

For the purpose of these gurarantees, a voter votes sincerely if
he doesn't falsify a preference or leave unvoted a preference that
the balloting system in use would have allowed him to vote in addition to 
the preferences that he actually voted.

Those gurantees that I mentioned are the criteria SFC & GSFC.

Complying methods are strategy-free under plausible conditions.

Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com