[EM] Condorcet, Same Ranks, Ties
Moe St. Evergreen
evergreen at lovemail.com
Thu Mar 15 07:13:33 PST 2001
I am waiting to see a system with similar properties to
Condorcet/Schultz or Ranked Pairs, but which allows voters to rank
multiple candidates at the same preference.
I feel that a preference choice that allows equal rankings may be
more satisfying to voters. The processing should be more fair to the
majority, than Cardinal Rankings or IRV is, and which should fulfill
the Condorcet criterion when there are no ties.
I am also waiting, (perhaps paradoxically) to see a system that
minimizes arbitrary/random tie breaking, as I feel arbitrary/random
is very hard to keep from being corrupt, and thus very hard to argue
for, especially in the US. Even using plurality to tie break, or a
Borda Count, would likely be more acceptable to arbitrary/random.
Finally, how does one resolve the problem of ballot access.
If we had 1000 candidates for a national president, would people
really want to go through a ballot ranking all 1000 candidates?
Or would we need to spend money on voting machines that force people,
for each choice, to choose from a list of 1000 candidates, then
output the ballot? I suspect we would get many abbreviated ballots.
Our organization has currently decided to use Approval Voting for
single winner, because it is better than plurality and cardinal
rankings, extremely easy to implement, easy to show majority support,
and decreases the likelihood of bad ballots (i.e. overvotes, same
rankings in single rank systems, mistaken write-in names). However, I
tend to prefer something that allows rankings and at least picks the
Condorcet Winner when there are no ties.
Right now IRV is increasingly supported as the only alternative to
plurality. IRV advocates are very loud and very unified, giving them
a cascading unfair advantage in the more progressive press
organizations, especially through their mouth pieces in Center for
Voting and Democracy, and in the Green Party. (I.e. Nader talks about
IRV, but no other possibility). If those who believe that IRV is one
of the worst alternatives, but also believe Plurality is worse than
IRV, wish to make any headway, we need to unify behind some
alternative that is easily implemented and understood. It seems to me
that Ranked Pairs and Plain Condorcet/Schultz would be at the top of
the lists for a unifying method. Ranked Pairs does seem, to me,
easier to explain than PC/S. Also all single rank methods (IRV, RP,
PC/S) suffer from the problem of making bad ballots more likely, and
RP and PC/S suffer from the problem of an overuse of randomness to
resolve ties.
If I am to reverse the advocation of IRV in the Green Party without
appearing to support plurality, I need to advocate an alterative.
Perhaps I should advocating a referendum to Green Party members
regarding the alternatives, with the results published and ranked
using Voter's Choice, simply for our own education on these matters.
Unfortunately, I find that discussions of these systems appear to
technical for most of our members.
I would find any responses most useful,
- Moe, Tampa Green Party.
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