Completion methods for Smith Sets

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Mon Jun 18 15:47:49 PDT 2001

```>Is this what you mean?;
>
>1) Find the candidate with the most first place votes.  That candidate is
>ranked #1
>2) Find the candidate with the most first and second place votes.  If that
>candidate is different to the candidate ranked #1, then that candidate is
>ranked #2.
>3) Continue process (with 1st, 2nd & 3rd place votes, then adding 4th place
>votes) until you have ranked all of the candidates but one.  Eliminate that
>candidate.
>4) Adjust the rankings so that 2nd preferences of the eliminated candidate
>becomes 1st preferences etc.  Return to step 1) until there is only one
>candidate remaining.

------
D- Since Mr. Rouse is a new poster, I review some elementary points.

There are at least 2 things going on in elections.

1. *absolute* acceptability on a 100 percent to minus 100 percent scale with
variants such as YES/NO or median votes.

2. *relative* acceptability --  such as 51 A > 49 B.

The relative part has 2 subparts-

the Condorcet Matrix (Condorcet's major contribution) and the Place Votes
Matrix.

Since ALL methods have strategy/ insincerity problems with 3 or more choices
(based on Mr. Arrow's observations and many earlier postings on this list
(including even the simple 1 choice case versus None Of The Above -- NOTA),
it is arbitrary which tiebreaker is used if there are not enough Condorcet
Winners (CW) (with 1 or more choices to be elected in executive/ judicial
elections or 2 or more in legislative body elections).

Again the general *relative* case is ---

N test winner(s) versus 1 test loser (other choices deemed losers) (done for
ALL  combinations)

The Droop quota is also involved in such 1 or more winner elections --- a
majority for executive/ judicial offices and the regular Droop quota for
legislative body seats.

That is, 1 or more *relative* winners may or may not get an *absolute*
acceptability Droop vote --- such as if Hitler, Stalin and Saddam were
running for Great Humanitarian of the last 100 years.

The sun will continue to rise whatever *understandable* tiebreaker is used--
if it is *understandable* by John/Mary Q. Voters, election officers and the
courts.

I repeat two of my earlier postings ---

1. Vote YES or NO (default) on each choice and use Number Votes (1, 2, etc.)
on each choice.
2. Choices getting a YES majority go head to head using the Number Votes.
3. If there is no Condorcet Winner (CW) using the Number Votes, then drop the
choice with the least number of YES votes (i.e. the largest number of NO
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3, if necessary.

Approval- Condorcet- Least Approval (ACLA)

Standard mantra (for newer folks) -

Approval by itself is defective by not showing *relative* support.

Rankings by itself is defective by not showing *absolute* support.

Combining both Approval and Rankings reduces the problems (and just might
happen to make things very difficult for devious insincere strategists).

Plus, of course, any reform method in order to have a chance to get adopted
in the real political world must pass the KISS test.

Do John/Mary Q. Voter have enough brains to vote YES/NO and to use number

How many of the methods on the current EM ballot do John/Mary Q. Voter
understand (and the insincere voting strategy of each) ???

----------
A simpler variant --

1. Vote YES or NO (default) on each choice and use Number Votes (1, 2, etc.)
on each choice.
2. Choices getting a YES majority go head to head using the Number Votes.
3. If there is no Condorcet Winner (CW) using the Number Votes, then the
choice with the most YES votes wins.

Approval- Condorcet- Most Approval (ACMA)

```