[EM] List PR

[Bart Ingles]

I like it.  It looks as though in the non-partisan case (or one where
there is exactly one candidate from each party), the system equates to
cumulative voting.  But at the opposite end, where all candidates belong
to a single party, it's equivalent to approval voting.

Or at least a multi-winner form of approval voting.  But in that case it
seems like it would be in the interest of at least some of the party
members to split the party.  I wonder if there's a corresponding
incentive to merge when there are too many parties?



LAYTON Craig wrote:
> 
> I've been thinking about ways to improve list proportional representation.
> I generally like STV for public elections, but it has a number of drawbacks,
> and is not always viable.
> 
> List PR is very simple, and using a d'Hondt count will result in better
> proportionality than any other method (aside from methods with variable
> voting power).  The problem is always the method of deciding which
> candidates from each party get elected.
> 
> This is my first thought - it is a free list method, where voters can mark a
> single box corresponding to a single party.  A regular d'Hondt count is used
> to determine how many seats each party is awarded.  However, voters have the
> option of voting "below the line" for candidates, rather than parties.  A
> voter can vote for as many candidates as they like.  A voter's vote is
> divided amoung the parties proportional to the number of candidates they
> vote for in each party.  ie If a voter votes for 2 candidates in party A, 1
> candidate in party B & 1 candidate in party C, party A gets .5 of a vote,
> and parties B & C .25 each.  These fractional amounts are added to the above
> the line (whole) votes to determine how many seats each party gets.  Seats
> are then awarded to the candidates in each party with the most below the
> line votes.
> 
> So, parties are elected based on plurality/cumulative type voting, and
> individual candidates using what basically amounts to approval.
> 
> It might even be better to avoid the above the line voting totally, and only
> have voting for candidates, but I've not yet decided on that.  Thoughts?

FFrom election-methods-list-request at eskimo.com  Fri Jun 15 22:32:36 2001
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Condorcet also applies with multi-member legislative bodies.

N test winners versus 1 test loser  -- others presumed to be losers (and get 
transferred to a test winner or test loser-- whichever happens first using 
rank order voting).

Example - 5 member legislative body, 10 candidates

ALL of the combinations of 5 versus 1 -- 4 losers would have to be done.

A test winner may or may not win all of his/her matches.

The good old YES/NO test can also be used as a tiebreaker if there are less 
than N Condorcet winners.

Again- I suggest that each winner should have a voting power in the 
legislative body equal to the final number of votes that he/she receives.

The above can of course be used with multi-member districts.

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Mr. Simmons wrote-

That's the main thing I have against list PR; it tends to produce voting
blocs (since the candidates have to be loyal to their party to get on
their list again next time) and voting blocs can introduce wide disparity
of power even in the presence of exact proportional representation.

----
D- Candidates should be nominated by *equal* nominating petitions -- such as 
by X percent of the number of voters at the last election in the area 
involved.

That is, NO *party bosses* putting names on a list in a certain order.