[EM] Borda strategy

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

>2. What does a strategy matrix look like for Condorcet? For Borda?
>For IRV? What conclusions can we draw from those?

Borda strategy is to rank the candidates in order of their
strategic value. I told how strategic value is calculated in a
previous posting, but I'll re-post it upon request.

The important thing about Condorcet is that voters don't need
strategy.

In 0-info elections, Blake pointed out that in a 3
candidate election, it's sometimes advantageous to insincerely
uprank your 2nd choice by voting him equal to your 1st choice.
Actually that's so if his utility for you is more than 2/3 of
the way from your last choice to your 1st choice.

I don't consider that important because our elections are not 0-info,
and because you'd only benefit from it in natural circular ties.

In non-0-info elections, someone could try offensive order-reversal,
and in fact the only people with reason to use strategy are the
person wanting to try offensive order-reversal and the person
defending against it. It's very unlikely that offensive order reversal would 
be tried by enough people to change the election result.
That means that in Condorcet you can ignore strategy. SFC & GSFC
are about that.

IRV strategy? Cox has described Runoff strategy, and IRV strategy
would be a vastly more complicated extension of that. So it isn't
just that IRV strategy is more drastic, as compared to Approval--
it's also incomparaby more complicated. I haven't heard of anyone
writing a formula for it.

You might say that if the IRVies succeed in enacting IRV, it
will be necessary for someone to calculate its strategy. Not as
far as I'm concerned--I just won't vote in IRV elections.

Mike Ossipoff



>
>  -- Richard
>
>

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