[EM] Districts (was: Proportionality in perspective)

[Blake Cretney]

I reply to Craig Layton later on.

On Sun, 11 Feb 2001 15:47:20 -0800
Bart Ingles <bartman at netgate.net> wrote (referring to the arguments I
previously made)

> I don't see how these problems are exclusive to locality, vs. any
other
> grouping used as a basis for representation (including ethnic
minority
> and even party membership).  

Well, I certainly wouldn't recommend representation on the basis of
ethnicity.  That would be even worse.

I'm not aware of any country that uses "party membership."  That would
suggest that non-party members wouldn't even get a vote (or would vote
in some "independent" grouping).

> It's just part of the nature of
> representation that a representative should try to get the best deal
> possible for his/her constituency.  Of course representatives have a
> dual responsibility, the other half of which is to represent society
as
> a whole (as is spelled out in the oath of office for U.S.
politicians).

It's a trivial point, but I don't see anything in the oath office
about representing society as a whole.  Not that I'm claiming that it
should, or that this would solve the problem.

> I think all of this would be true even if the constituency were
> self-selecting, as in  districtless STV.

Many of my points would clearly not apply in a districtless system. 
For example, Cabinet Ministers would have no districts to spend extra
money in.

However, it is true that even in a districtless system, candidates
have reason to help those who support them.  In reality, by helping
their ideology, candidates will likely believe they are helping
society as a whole, because this is what every ideology claims.

However, I don't agree with you that that is equivalent to a system
where every member tries to get clauses in each bill to help his
district, or where the executive attempts to locate benefits on the
basis of strategy.

--------------------------------------

On Mon, 12 Feb 2001 09:56:28 +1100
LAYTON Craig <Craig.LAYTON at add.nsw.gov.au> wrote:

> >One point you mention is "locality of representation." 
> >Leaving aside the issues of proportionality, and list vs.
> >individual systems, I would argue that locality of
> >representation is actually a bad thing, and it certainly
> >doesn't make sense to compromise some other standard in
> >pursuit of it.
> >
> >You may have some justification for locality.  I can't
> >recall ever having read someone directly defend the
> >principle.  People usually just assume that it is a good
> >thing.  However, on the surface it isn't obvious why we
> >should be representing people on the basis of geography.
> 
> In Australia, and I assume all Westminster-based systems (you can
correct me
> if I'm wrong), the local member performs an important purpose -
"making
> representations" on behalf of constituents in their dealings with
government
> bureaucracy.  If there weren't local members, I'm sure that some
alternative
> could be found, but it works really well.  Despite party solidarity,
local
> members will still pressure ministers from their own party for a
response if
> your grievance appears serious and founded. This is likely to be
even more
> effective if you have a number of local representatives, so that you
can go
> to one of the same party as yourself, and there is an extremely good
chance
> that your first or second choice is holding office.

One problem that you imply is that local government members will have
much better recourse to the Ministers than will opposition.  Also, it
isn't clear that districts in themselves are particularly useful, as
long as the candidates are reasonably distributed, it doesn't matter
that there isn't one for each arbitrarily constructed district.

There are other deeper problems, however.  There is a natural conflict
between the roles of district representative and cabinet minister (or
even district representative and legislator).  As well, I see the
interest in case work for MP's to be symptomatic of the fact that they
do not act as legislators in the Westminster model.  Because they
aren't busy considering the merits of legislation, or who should hold
offices, some work has to be found for them.  It seems that what they
often end up doing is helping their constituents deal with the
bureaucracy.

Often this is likely beneficial.  Often, it seems to involve helping
friends or contributors cut through red tape, or jump various queues. 
Usually, it would be better to improve the bureaucracy than to provide
a small number of people to assist with its absurdity.

But, the thing I want you to consider is that most of the reforms
suggested on this list are intended (or would have the effect) of
giving representatives much more power and independence.  It seems
that the goal is to put them much more in the role of legislators. 
But this will tend to exclude case work, just as a matter of time
constraint.

Of course, you could appoint (or even elect) civil servants to fulfill
this case-work role.  However, I doubt this is a popular enough
activity that the public would be willing to pay for it.

> But, as I pointed out, there could be an alternative to this
process.  What
> there is no alternative for, is putting candidate election into the
hands of
> the voters.  

Of course, it is possible that districtlessness is incompatible with
some otherwise desirable standards.  My original point was only that
geographic representation shouldn't be listed or considered as a
desirable property in and of itself.  Of course, districts makes
non-list systems feasible for large numbers of candidates.

> It is an unevoidable consequence of party list systems that the
> parties basically decide who will hold office before the election. 
In
> reality, only a handful of seats are ever contested (you would know,
for
> instance, that the first 40 republicans on the ticket and the first
40
> democrats were going to be elected).

Let's say my uncle has voted conservative in every election for the
last 40 years.  I guess that it is extremely unlikely that he will
ever not vote conservative.  His vote is predictable.  However, this
doesn't mean that it isn't his free choice.  Similarly, even if we can
predict that 40% will always vote Republican, it is still the choice
of that 40% to vote Republican.  So, they are still the ones who
decide that those Republicans get elected.

> Despite the fact that you can design list systems to allow people to
> distinguish between candidates of the same party, in practice voters
do not
> take this option.  If you have a free list system, which makes the
best
> attempt of the list systems to give voters a choice, the result will
be
> determined by a small handful of voters, which will either be from a
strong
> minority faction, able to instruct it's supporters in detail how to
vote, or
> by only the most educated voters, again disenfranchising poorer,
working
> class voters.

Are you claiming that less educated voters will vote meaningfully
between the candidates of one party in STV, but will not in an open
list method?  You seem to acknowledge that a large number will vote
randomly between party members in STV.  As far as I'm concerned, if
voters are unwilling or unable to choose between candidates, this
suggests that a simple closed list should be presented during the
general election.  The list to be presented could be chosen by a
primary of party members (to avoid it being simply the preference of
the infamous "party bosses").  I think it's obvious that a simple
system is better for the uneducated.

If parties are distinguishable based on their ideology, and their
track record, then no vote can be more powerful than a vote for a
party.  This is why I don't think that less educated voters would be
disenfranchised.  It seems to me that it is much worse to have a
personality based election, where the candidates have limited records,
and it is unclear where they stand on basic issues.  This seems to be
the kind of election they have in the States.  This is far worse for
the uneducated.

In a pure list system, voters are expected to judge which party best
represents them, based at least in part, on the candidates it
proposes.  Because the list is fixed, voters have the whole election
to get a feel for what its candidates are like.  In an open list or
STV, there is no known entity corresponding to the closed list, except
the individual members in the district.  So, anyone who doesn't
properly become aware of the individual candidates in their district,
is better served by a closed list.

Also, consider the McDonald's effect.  Why are franchises so
successful?  Is it because there products are better?  I would argue
that it is primarily because of cost effective advertising.  It is
simply much easier for McDonald's to establish brand recognition
nationally than it would be for each individual restaurant to get the
same level of brand recognition in its area.  The same is true for
political parties vs. individual politicians.

So, we can expect that an American style personality election will
require more money than a list election.  Increasing the importance of
money in politics certainly doesn't help the working class.

---
Blake Cretney