[EM] three tier approval

[Richard Moore]

LAYTON Craig wrote:
> Anyway, voters have three different ways they can vote for candidates -
> dissaprove, approve and strongly approve.  Then, conduct a pairwise count,
> where for a pairwise comparison on each ballot;
> 
> If both A and B are strongly approved, they each get 1 point
> If A is ranked over B, A gets 1 point and B gets 0 points
> If both A and B are approved, they each get 1/2 point
> If both A and B are dissaproved, they get 0 points
> 
> You then use Ranked Pairs (WINNING VOTES) to tabulate the winner / ranking.
> With this score structure, you're much more likely to get a Condorcet
> winner.

The three-tiered rating could actually conceal the CW, so 
that you couldn't tell who it is from the ballots. If A and 
B are ranked equally on most of the ballots, but A beats 
every candidate including B, then A will appear to be the 
CW. But B could still be preferred over A by a majority, and 
that doesn't show due to the collapsing.

Of course, this is what happens in ordinary Approval, too. 
This method and Forest's Five-Slot Approval are 
finer-grained versions. I think your point system is a novel 
idea. I don't remember how Forest recommended scoring FSA.

Richard