Fixing IRV

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Mon Aug 13 16:17:03 PDT 2001


Forest wrote-

The following example has dampened my enthusiasm for Roy's IRV fix based
on eliminating the candidate with the lowest median rank:

13 ABCXD
13 BCDXA
13 CDAXB
13 DABXC
16 XABCD
16 XBCDA
16 XCDAB
100

Note that X is both the Condorcet Winner and the candidate with the lowest 
median rank
-----
D- Doing some place votes math-

-   --   1   2   3   4   5

1   13   A   B   C   X   D
2   13   B   C   D   X   A
3   13   C   D   A   X   B
4   13   D   A   B   X   C
5   16   X   A   B   C   D
6   16   X   B   C   D   A
7   16   X   C   D   A   B

Grouping the votes---

-         1    2   3    4    5    TOT

A        13   29   13   16   29   100
B        13   29   29    0   29   100
C        13   29   29   16   13   100
D        13   13   29   16   29   100
X        48    0    0   52    0   100

Combining 1+2 and 4+5 ----

-         
           1+2   3   4+5      TOT
          
A           42   13   45      100
B           42   29   29      100
C           42   29   29      100
D           26   29   45      100
X           48    0   52      100
           
           (1+2)-(4+5)
           
A               -3
B               13
C               13
D              -19
X               -4

                 0

I have mentioned many times that a YES/NO vote should be done.

The above Forest example is an excellent reason to do so.

IF (repeat, IF) a 4th or 5th place vote was a NO vote, then X would lose 
(even though X is a Condorcet Winner).

How many *near* clones are in the example ---- especially A>B, B>C, C>D, D>A 
???

I note again that it may be difficult to tell where *near* clones come from.

N1 X > Y
N2 Y > X

Z comes along

Possible ---

NIA  Z > X > Y
N1B  X > Z > Y
N1C  X > Y > Z

N1

N2A  Z > Y > X
N2B  Y > Z > X
N2C  Y > X > Z

N2

Whether Z is an opposite or a clone *leader* may be difficult to detect



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