[EM] Demorep's new method

Rob LeGrand honky1998 at yahoo.com
Sat Aug 11 23:25:41 PDT 2001

Anthony Simmons wrote:
> For example, use ranked ballots.  Count them
> using three different methods, chosen so that
> their strategies conflict, and any strategy that
> works for one method would be counterproductive
> for the others.  Then take the social rankings
> produced by counting the votes using those three
> different methods, and use those a ballots in a
> Borda count.
. . .
> At first blush, it looks like Borda could be
> used as the metamethod because nobody would be in
> a position to use strategy to manipulate it.

This is a cool idea.  But the resulting metamethod
is still just a (more complex) deterministic
ranked-ballot method and is thus vulnerable to
strategy.  That strategy might not be as obvious,
but it seems to me that, given enough analysis,
the metamethod won't be any harder to manipulate
than the best Condorcet methods like beatpath or
Ranked Pairs.  Another problem is that proving
Condorcet or Smith compliance would likely be
difficult if you choose methods whose strategies
tend to conflict.  Proving monotonicity or clone-
independence might be hard too.

If rolling a die is allowed, choosing an election
method randomly after all ballots are in seems
like a great idea to me.  It would have limited
randomness if the methods are similar enough.
How hard would it be to choose Condorcet methods
so that their strategies conflict enough to make
it worthwhile?  (Using Borda as one of the
methods *might* not be too bad, but using
something like IRV or Coombs would be less
acceptable.)  I doubt you'd be able to produce
a completely non-manipulable scheme using this
idea, though.

Rob LeGrand
honky98 at aggies.org

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