Mixed Condorcet-Plurality

[Tom Ruen]

Demorep,

> 34 ABC
> 33 BCA
> 32 CAB
> 99

By the reasonable assumption that voters put the most energy into their
first rank choice, and lower ranks demonstrate cyclic preferences, I'm
completely willing to abandon majority rule and give victory to A with 34%
of the vote in your example. This is a good demonstration for me where
plurality is a reasonable choice.

Tom

----- Original Message -----
From: <DEMOREP1 at aol.com>
To: <election-methods-list at eskimo.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 1:21 PM
Subject: RE: Mixed Condorcet-Plurality


> Mr. Ruen wrote in part-
>
> That's why I would consider a plurality winner as the "fair" choice among
>
> the top set of mutually defeatable candidates. Among that set no
elimination
>
> (candidates or defeats) is clearly fair and so it makes some sense to
>
> retreat to plurality as the best choice. Well, this is perhaps the only
good
>
> use for plurality that I know!
> ----
> D- My standard example-
>
> 34 ABC
> 33 BCA
> 32 CAB
> 99
>
> Who has *majority* support ???
>
> For newer folks I suggest a YES/NO vote on each choice.
> If 2 or more YES majorities, then they go head to head.
> If still a tie, then the highest YES majority wins---
>
> i.e. YES majority /head to head (Condorcet)/ highest YES (Approval) (or
> possibly sum the YES votes by place vote positions to get the earliest
> majority).
>
> Plurality should have gone to the political history junkyard long ago (to
> rest in peace with divine right of kings).