[EM] Minimizing need for insincerity

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Markus said:

>you wrote (16 Sep 2000):
> > Approval has no offensive strategy. That's one reason
> > why Approval has a stability unequalled among voting
> > systems.
>
>You wrote (6 Sep 2000): "A voter uses offensive strategy
>if he votes in a way intended to take victory from a SCW
>& give it to someone else whom he likes better."
>
>I don't see why offensive strategies are not possible
>under Approval Voting. Could you please give an
>explanation? Could you please explain e.g. why bullet
>voting is not an offensive strategy under Approval
>Voting?

Yes, I suppose if you know that a certain candidate was CW,
but hoped that the people who could make him beat your favorite
would think they don't need him, and not support him, then
you might beleive that bullet-voting could make your candidate
win, where the CW would win if you voted for him.

However, do we say that it's you who's making the CW lose, or
do we say it's the people who needed him to beat your favorite
but didn't vote for him. I've always said that there isn't
anything that we can do to protect the interests of people who
need a compromise but don't support the compromise, for whatever
reason, such as mis-esitmates.

So I'd felt that the bullet-voter isn't defeating that CW. The
CW is defeated by the people who needed him but didn't vote for
him. I mean, who has more responsibility to vote for him? Someone
who needs him to beat your favorite whom they like less? Or you,
who are convinced, rightly, that your favorite can beat the CW
if others who need him as a compromise don't support him?

Maybe this shows that my definition of offensive strategy isn'
complete. Maybe I should say "... a CW who is fully supported against
the candidate for whom you take the win away from the CW." That
would be more in keeping with my intent when looking for a
definition of offensive strategy. Maybe It should say "...a CW
whom a majority vote over the candidate for whom you're trying
to take victory from the CW." Or "... a CW who is voted over your
the candidate for whom you're trying to take  victory from the
CW by everyone who prefers the CW over that candidate." That's the
same as the 1st definition, but more completely worded.

I never felt completely satisfied with my definition of offensive
strategy. Defining offensive & defensive strategy isn't as important
as criteria, and doesn't matter for criteria (for the purposes of
the criteria, defensive strategy is merely what the defensive
strategy minimize the need for--for me the criteria come before
the definition of defensive strategy).

But sometimes it's useful to speak of offensive or defensive
strategy, as when I used the term in the letter you replied to.
So thank you for helping to improve that definition.

Maybe one of those that I listed here will be the one that I
like or that some others like.

But to return to your question, it just seems to me that
taking advantage of the fact that the CW wasn't supported doesn't
seem in the same class with order-reversal with a pairwise-count
method or IRV, because it was the people who needed that CW who
dropped the ball. You merely picked it up. You know, SFC, GSFC,
WDSC, & SDSC all are about beating someone whom a majority vote
someone else over. Maybe, then, a standard like that should
be used to judge how wrongful is the win of the person for whom
you're trying to take victory from the CW.

I realize that that's just an impression rather than a proof or
a precise argument. I'll probably like one of those definitions
of offensive strategy that I listed, and in that case I'd be able
to say that your bullet voting isn't offensive strategy--by
re-defining offensive strategy :-)

Mike Ossipoff



Mike Ossipoff

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