[EM] Minimizing need for insincerity

Markus Schulze schulze at sol.physik.tu-berlin.de
Sun Sep 17 02:59:23 PDT 2000


Dear Mike,

you wrote (16 Sep 2000):
> Approval has no offensive strategy. That's one reason
> why Approval has a stability unequalled among voting
> systems.

You wrote (6 Sep 2000): "A voter uses offensive strategy
if he votes in a way intended to take victory from a SCW
& give it to someone else whom he likes better."

I don't see why offensive strategies are not possible
under Approval Voting. Could you please give an
explanation? Could you please explain e.g. why bullet
voting is not an offensive strategy under Approval
Voting?

Markus Schulze
schulze at sol.physik.tu-berlin.de
schulze at math.tu-berlin.de
markusschulze at planet-interkom.de



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