[EM] Stronger UUCC (UUCC2)

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Here's how I'd define a stronger UUCC. Since this is new, I don't
guarantee that it won't turn out to requre touching up. On the other
hand, I expect it to be right as-is:

UUCC2:

It should never be possible to contrive a configuration of candidates,
voters, voters' sincere ratings, and voters' actual votes, with
which Bc wins and there's some group of 1 or more voters for whom:
1) They're ballots all vote Bc over B; & 2) There's no way in which they
could all change their ballots so as to no longer vote Bc over B
without causing the election of someone whom they all like less than Bc.

[end of definition]

Stronger & weaker criteria are useful because they distinguish between
different sets of methods. So UUCC & UUCC2 could both be useful.

UUCC, being the weaker of the two, is the more embarrassing to fail.
The 3 worst methods fail that weaker criterion.

Blake has shown that Condorcet, Schulze, & Tideman(m) fail the stronger
UUCC2. UUCC2 may turn out to be another exclusive criterion compliance
of Approval. Since it hasn't been shown yet how Condorcet, Schulze
& Tideman(m) do by UUCC, that too may turn out to be an exclusive
Approval compliance, or it may be that one or more pairwise-count
methods passes UUCC.

Mike Ossipoff





_________________________________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com.

Share information about yourself, create your own public profile at 
http://profiles.msn.com.