CVD wants Alt.V to be fairer but it isn't: misleading website

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

I'd said:

Using Condorcet doesn't require any math. Anyone can rank their choices.

Demorep wrote:

---
D- We have gone over this before many times.  Some of the public, media and
politicians with some brains will want to know exactly what is done with the
ranked votes (thus producing some instant math confusion).

I reply:


And you think that Tideman(m), SSD, and PC are all too complicated?
We'll never know till we offer them. We could give up in advance,
and not propose Condorcet anywhere. That's called
"pre-emptive surrender". The problem isn't that Condorcet is too
complicated. The problem is that it's one of innumerable ways of
counting ranked ballots. If we've got the busy little IRVies on the
job, then we have to convince people why one way of counting
ranked ballots is better than another. That could be a job, especially
when we consider IRV's money, big membership, and promotional
zealotry. Should we, then, give up? Let's find out what happens, first.

As I said, there are places and situations where I'd start out with
Approval as the proposal, and there are other places & situations where
I'd offer Condorcet. I do agree, however, that, with the IRVies on
the job, the best chance of getting a good method adopted is to
point to the tremendous simplicity advantages of Approval. The fact
that Approval is nothing other than Plurality done right, while IRV
is a whole new method. The fact that Approval is instantly implemetable
at no cost. The fact that it takes one short sentence, a few seconds,
to describe & propose Approval. And, aside from all that, of course,
the fact that Approval is incomparably better than IRV in terms of
criteria, and apparently also in terms of worst-case SU ratio for
0-info elections.

Demorep continues:

The more ABC, etc,  XYZ criteria that are thrown out as being absolutely
critical for an election method, the more the public will get confused and
keep same old rotten plurality.

I reply:

I disagree. Some criteria can't be ignored. True, many don't like
criteria, but those same people care very much about the LO2E problem,
and will listen when told that the criteria measure for the LO2E
standard, and for the majority rule standard.

Demorep continues:

     Many folks are not quite so strategy/
conspiratorial minded as some folks on this list (especially regarding added
or removed votes from the ballot boxes).

I reply:

You're very mistaken there. Most folks are not only strategy-conscious,
but are thoroughly & pitifully cowed & dominated by their perceived
need to strategize. Most reform folks are very concerned about the
lesser-of-2-evils probem, for that reason. Even the IRVies pay
lip-service to it, as they cheerfully botch single-winner reform.

Demorep continues:

The well known KISS principle definitely applies for getting election 
reforms
in the U.S.A.

I reply;

KISSies want to give up before we even find out what people will
accept. That's what I referred to above as "pre-emptive surrender".

It's for simplicity that, when I propose Condorcet, I propose it
without any of the enhancements that would further improve it. I
propose it in its simple unenhanced form, to keep the proposal simple.

Anyway, you want to complicate rank-balloting methods by adding
Y/N to the ballot. That doesn't just complicate the proposal and the
ballot. It tremendously complicates the voting strategy too.

But if you mean that Approval would be a better proposal, because
it's far simpler than any of the rank-balloting/rank-count proposals,
then I hope that means that you're advocating Approval.

Demorep continues:

Regarding Approval, it exists already in many States in issue elections.

I reply:

Nope. What exists in the U.S. for conflicting initiatives is
"Y/N Approval", or "Approval with Y/N". That's very different from
Approval. You, Demorep, would like it better than Approval, because
of its Y/N component. But that makes its strategy very much more
complicated than that of Approval, whose strategy is no more difficult
than that of Plurality. I don't advocate Y/N Approval.

Demorep continues:

Standard circular tie simple example.  A, B and C are acceptable to a
majority of the voters on a simple YES/NO vote.

35 ABC
34 BCA
33 CAB

102

Which choice should win ???

I reply:

Every Condorcetist or BeatpathWinner advocate on this list would
agree that A should win.

Demorep continues:

Regarding CVD's pushing of IRV, the standard response should be something
like my now standard Hitler-Stalin-Washington example

34 HWS
33 SWH
16 WHS
16 WSH
99

With IRV Washington loses. Hitler wins. Stalin is not amused.  Let the civil
war begin.  Will CVD survive ???

I reply:

Maybe CVD would do fine with Stalin or Hitler, because CVD is as
antidemocratic in its internal governance as it is in its
sleazy tactics in LWV. The Center for Voting & Democracy couldn't
be any more antidemocratic than it is. I hope you'll help publicize
that, along with IRV's failures, to the people to whom CVD is
promoting its nonreform.

Demorep continues:

That is, CVD should only be pushing p.r.
at the moment.

I reply:

That's for sure. I wish you could convice them to get out of the
way, and stay out of single-winner reform, instead of aggressively
promoting something that no one but them likes.

Mike Ossipoff





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