Let's found an organization to oppose IRV

LAYTON Craig Craig.LAYTON at add.nsw.gov.au
Tue Nov 21 14:37:30 PST 2000

Bart Ingles wrote:

>Realistic elections would have some variation in voter preference
>levels, which would tend to dampen out the strategy shifts like those
>described below.  In other words, not all voters would be likely to
>shift strategy at the same time.

I might re-iterate the importance of how-to-vote cards in elections other
than simple plurality (the parties instruct their voters how to vote).  The
majority of voters follow the how to vote cards, so a shift need only be
made by the party strategists.

>IRV has some bizarre strategies as well -- if there is any doubt about
>Nader's ability to defeat Bush, then the Nader voters should
>strategically rank Gore first.  Unless of course they think that Gore is
>not much better than Bush, in which case they should threaten to bullet
>vote (or even to rank Gore below Bush) in an attempt to coerce the Gore
>voters into strategically ranking Nader first.
>Changing strategy in response to polling data is not unique to approval

All true.  However, assuming that most voters follow their party's
instructions, some problems in IRV are mitigated by preference swapping
deals, which generally help to minimise monotonicity violations.

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