[EM] Re: Let's found an organization to oppose IRV

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Tue Nov 21 09:30:56 PST 2000

Bart wrote in part --

Condorcet example:
1) Polls show a low social utility [?] candidate as the likely Condorcet

45  A(10)    B(2)     C(0)
11  B(10)           A,C(0)
44  C(10)    B(2)     A(0)

2) The A and C voters realize that they can improve utility expectations
by eliminating B, placing them in a statistical dead heat with
one-another.  They plan to bullet-vote, choosing the AC lottery over B.

45  A
11  B
44  C

3) Further polling data shows that A is likely to win after all.  The C
voters react by ranking B.  A has no particular reason to vote sincerely
under a wv system (and scant reason under margins):

45  A
11  B
44  C, B

IRV has some bizarre strategies as well -- if there is any doubt about
Nader's ability to defeat Bush, then the Nader voters should
strategically rank Gore first.  Unless of course they think that Gore is
not much better than Bush, in which case they should threaten to bullet
vote (or even to rank Gore below Bush) in an attempt to coerce the Gore
voters into strategically ranking Nader first.

Changing strategy in response to polling data is not unique to approval
D- I beat the dead horse some more.

If no candidate gets a YES majority from the voters, then no choice should 
win --- the legislative body would fill any vacancy (with all of the original 
choices disqualified) .

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