Approval Vote: The unfairness of being dead

Wed May 31 22:37:30 PDT 2000

>D- How about the probability of the below ???
>2 AJ
>1 J

In the above example, the A voters are voting for their last
choice, something that no one would ever have any reason to do
in Approval.

>or ---
>3 AJ
>1 A
>2 J
>1 C

In the above example, A has a 4/7 majority, but his voters
apparently belive that they need to vote for J, because they
think that C will get more votes than A. But C only gets 1
vote, making C the lowest votegetter. Again, the example is one
in which the A voters have made an implausibly big mis-estimate.
Especially since previous election results are available and
give an accurate estimate of the strength of the various factions
or parties or candidates.

>No need----
>Approval is defective by treating all actual votes cast as being the same
>(i.e. unranked) when in reality, of course, voters rank choices (if given
>that option).

And wouldn't it be nice if those rankings would always be sincere.
But, in reality, with any rank-method there can be situations where
someone has strategic need to reverse one or more of his
sincere preferences. With Condorcet, that happens in a less-
important way, and I consider Condorcet's other criterion
compliances to outweigh that problem. With other rank methods,
the problem happens in a big way, and more often, and the methods
offer nothing to outweigh it.

Which is worse? Not ranking all the candidates, or having to
rank some of them in reversed order? Having to bury your favorite?

Mike Ossipoff

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