[EM] vulnerability to compromise?

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

>
>Steve wrote (11 May 2000):
> > Markus wrote (10 May 2000):
> > > It can be argued that -in the Schulze method- if some
> > > voters uprank D ahead of A or downrank A behind D then
> > > this means that candidate A becomes less popular and that
> > > it is therefore legitimate when candidate A loses the
> > > elections.

> >
> > That's a flawed argument. Candidate A is not really less
> > popular; it merely appears that way if one trusts the
> > sincerity of the votes.

Yes, when people use compromise strategy, insincerely upranking
someone in order to defeat someone who is worse, their doing so
doesn't mean that that compromise has gained popularity; it only
means that those voters have strategized to defeat someone.
With the best rank-methods, we can do much to make it unnecessary
for voters to use compromise strategy, and that's a desirable goal.

Likewise, it isn't really a good thing if burying is often
being successfully employed to steal the election from
sincere CWs.

But sure, it isn't wrong if voting someone higher can make him
win or if voting someone lower could make him lose.

SFC & GSFC discuss conditions under which neither compromise
nor any other strategy is necessary in order to make someone
lose.

With BC complying methods, if a majority of all the voters prefer
some certain other candidate to X, then they don't need
compromise strategy to make him lose. That's MDC.

Also, with methods that meet that criterion, if burying ever
became a well known strategy, and one that people wanted to use,
it would be well-deterred, because it's so easy to make it
backfire.

These considerations about burying & compromise count against
margins methods in their comparison with Condorcet.

Also, IRV will routinely require the most extreme form of
compromise strategy.

Mike Ossipoff

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