More 0-info pairwise strategy

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

>D- If everybody truncates, then the result is obviously plurality.
 >

Mr. Ossipoff- Then don't truncate unless you want to. It wouldn't be like
Plurality
unless everyone truncated to the extent of only listing one choice.

If everyone wanted to do that for some reason, that's their choice.
The method doesn't strategically require them to. There's no need
to force people to rank more candidates than they want to.
----
D- Back to real politics land- there will be polls.

Polls won't make people vote only for their favorite. Do they do
that now? That would be nice, but it doesn't happen in
real-world-land.

Any candidate with circa 30 plus percent of the votes in a poll will play 
the
plurality politics game and try to get his/her devious voters not to make
additional choices.

Mike says:

No, you can't say that. It depends on the candidate. Some candidates
won't run if it will spoil the election. Such a candidate would
tell his people to rank their 2nd choices. And if a candidate
told you to not rank anyone but him, but didn't follow you into
the voting booth, are you necessarily going to do what he says?
Given a candidate who doesn't care about spoiling, and a voter
who's entirely obedient to that candidate, sure a few people might
do that. But it isn't the general fact that you make it out to be.
By the way, it's fine with me if people vote only for their favorite
out of principle. Don't worry--there's no indication that people
are inclined to do that.

Demorep says:

The voters with candidates getting less than such circa 30 percent in a poll
will obviously think- our/my first choice has NO chance of winning, we/I 
know
about such devious candidate and his/her voters and therefore we/I must also
play the plurality game and vote for the lesser of the plurality evils.

Mike says:

Why? Why would anyone feel a need to do that with Condorcet or
Approval? Maybe I would, simply out of principle, but certainly
not out of any strategic need. Of course it's true that in a 3-
candidate election supporters of the middle candidate have no
important reason to vote for anyone but their favorite in
Approval or Condorcet, and it's also true that, with a really
devious electorate, with Condorcet, supporters of a likely SCW
could have incentive to vote only for him in order to deter
devious offensive strategy. But let's not try to make that into
a general tendency for everyone.

Demorep says:

Real politics result- The Minnesota governor election in 1998. Ventura circa
37 percent, Dem- circa 32 percent, Repub- circa 31 percent (or vice versa 
?).

Mike says:

But what does that example say against Approval or Condorcet?

Demorep says:

How much loss of freedom is there if a voter is required to rank perhaps at
least 3 choices and vote YES/NO on each choice (default is NO) (to lessen 
the
polls/plurality strategy game) ??

Mike says:

Condorcet isn't like Plurality. Freedom to vote only for one
is different from not being allowed to vote for more than 1.
If there are 3 candidates, why should a supporter of the middle
candidate be required to vote one extreme over the other if he
doesn't want to?

DR says:

Since I am calling for a YES majority vote before the head to head results
are even looked at, I am not sure if any of the 3 MN candidates would have
been elected (default- the legislature fills the office).  Having a YES
majority requirement will probably force additional choices to be made among
those devious plurality candidates and their devious supporters.

Mike says:

Y/N could be added to any method of course. I don't like the way
it complicates the strategy, but the whole package would have
a better chance of getting through if it were proposed in simplest
form, perhaps without Y/N, and then Y/N could be proposed afterwards.

Mike Ossipoff














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