[EM] Another false quote made by Markus

Markus Schulze schulze at sol.physik.tu-berlin.de
Mon Jun 19 01:07:42 PDT 2000


Dear Mike,

you wrote (19 June 2000):
> Markus said here that on May 13, on this list, I said that my
> "Tideman bad-example" was possible, as written. That seemed
> quite unlikely at the time, because it was long before May 13
> that someone pointed out to me that Bruce Anderson hadn't
> said that every pairwise vote table corresponds to some set
> of rankings, as I'd till then believed that he'd said.

But in a private mail you wrote (13 May 2000):
> I don't remember any details about the "Tideman fails GMC"
> example. I posted one, but I don't remember what the
> defeat magnitudes were, or have a copy of it.
>
> But if some voters were indifferent between the 2 methods' winners,
> then method M1's winner could beat method M2's winner, with no
> one preferring M2's winner to M1's winner, without there having
> to be a violation of Pareto. A few people rank M1's winner over
> M2's winner, and the rest don't express a preference between the
> two.
>
> The Pareto criterion is probably usually or always described
> in terms of everyone preferring one candidate to another. But
> I guess what they're really referring to is that Pareto forbids
> electing a candidate over whom everyone _votes_ a certain other
> candidate. UUCC is about actual sincere preferences.

As far as I interpret you correctly, M1 = Tideman and M2 = Schulze.

You wrote (13 May 2000):
> Steve didn't say that Beatpath Winner chose a Pareto inferior
> candidate or violated Pareto. He merely said that it chose
> a candidate whom no voter preferred to the Tideman winner, and
> which was pairwise-beaten by the Tideman winner.
>
> That doesn't require a Pareto violation. For instance, say
> that a few voters rank the Tideman winner over Beatpath Winner's
> winner, and that the rest of the voters are indifferent between
> those two. The situation that Steve described exists, without
> a violation of Pareto.
>
> Actually, though Pareto is usually described in terms of
> everyone preferring one candidate to another, I believe that
> what's really meant by the Pareto criterion is that a candidate
> shouldn't win if another candidate is _voted_ over him by
> all the voters. If that criterion were really about sincere
> preferences, then lots more methods would fail the criterion.
> UUCC, however, is about sincere preferences.

If you didn't want to say that Steve's example "showing the Schulze
method preferred a candidate even though no voter preferred it to
the Tideman winner which beat it pairwise" was possible, then why
did you write that "the situation that Steve described exists"?

Even in your 19 May 2000 mail, you wrote that you don't know
whether it is possible or impossible to create an example "showing
the Schulze method preferred a candidate even though no voter
preferred it to the Tideman winner which beat it pairwise":
> Is that situation impossible because it isn't possible to supply
> a set of rankings for it? Of course, aside from that, of itself,
> it the fact that no one ranks A over B doesn't meant that A can't
> have a strong beatpath to B. And the fact that someone ranks B over
> A doesn't mean that B has a strong beatpath to A. But maybe it's
> that that situation can't be created by a set of rankings. I don't
> know.

Therefore I don't see any justification for your claim that I
misquoted you.

By the way: Steve wrote twice (23 Feb 2000; 11 May 2000) that you
claimed that it was possible to create an example "showing the
Schulze method preferred a candidate even though no voter preferred
it to the Tideman winner which beat it pairwise." So why don't you
accuse Steve for misquoting you?

Markus Schulze
schulze at sol.physik.tu-berlin.de
schulze at math.tu-berlin.de
markusschulze at planet-interkom.de



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list