Dollar example

Bart Ingles bartman at
Wed Feb 23 12:49:25 PST 2000

DEMOREP1 at wrote:
> Mr. Ingles wrote in part-
> Group A and C are each close to half of the population, with group B
> only a small minority.  Exact populations are unknown.
> ~50   A($1000)    B($550)    C($500)
>  ~1   B($20500)            A=C($500)
> ~50   C($1000)    B($550)    A($500)
> Converted to vN-M utilities, we have:
> ~50  A(1.0)    B(0.1)    C(0)
>  ~1  B(1.0)            A=C(0)
> ~50  C(1.0)    B(0.1)    A(0)
> ---
> D- This is a revised repeat of earlier postings regarding the defects of
> simple Approval Voting, simple Condorcet and simple ratings.

Again, this was not intended to address any real-world voting system,
merely the claim that the CW is always the best or fairest choice for

> Yet again I suggest a YES/NO vote first.  Does A, B or C get a YES majority
> of all of the voters ??
> Only the 2 or more choices getting YES majorities should go head to head.

Nobody gets a sincere YES majority.  In a real world Y/N Condorcet
method, some of the A and C voters could get together and insincerely
give each other YES votes, possibly by marking up absentee ballots and
then mailing them in each other's presence.

> In reality land, I would suggest that the A and C supporters would compromise
> on something closer to total money/total members.

Depends on the nature of the election.  You'd think in some recent real
world elections, parties could have gotten together and drafted better
candidates too.

If your claim is that this whole election is defective because of an
artificially weak field of candidates, I have recently had to make the
same claim regarding ratings examples.  Obviously neither method can
compensate for a bad nominating process.

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