Differences of sincerity definitions

[Bart Ingles]

LAYTON Craig wrote:
>
> Sorry in my rather hasty example, there are supposed to be 5 candidates,
> with the voters preferences being:
> 
> A=B>C=D>E
> 
> My question being, how can you (in a relatively simple fashion) allow a
> voter to vote like this?  What kind of instructions could you use, how would
> you structure the ballot paper, what would determine a valid vote?


I assume you're asking specifically about IRV.  One approach which was
kicked around a few years ago in this list (some of the members
apparently tried to interest CVD in it as a way to mitigate some of
IRV's problems) was to simply count the votes as you would with approval
voting; in other words each surviving top-choice vote counts as a full
vote.  The voter would rank your example above as

A: 1
B: 1
C: 2
D: 2
E: 3 (or unranked).

The vote doesn't transfer to C and D until A and B are both eliminated.

This is probably a slight improvement over normal IRV in some ways, but
may be slightly more susceptible to pushover strategy.  You can probably
find it in the list archives; I think it was called IR-1 or something
like that.