[EM] Re: Proportional preferential voting

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Cretney wrote in part-

On the other hand, any method that satisfies the Condorcet criterion,
and gives a defined result in all situations, will violate SPC.

Consider a Condorcet criterion method (X) with the following ballots.

45 A B C
25 B C A
30 C A B

if the result of X is A, then alter 45 A B C to 45 A C B.  Now C is
the CW, so must win.  SPC is violated.

if the result of X is B, then alter 25 B C A to 25 B A C.  Now A is
the CW, so must win.  SPC is violated.

if the result of X is C, then alter 30 C A B to 30 C B A.  Now B is
the CW, so must win.  SPC is violated.

To prove the same thing for probabilistic methods, substitute "the
result of X may be" for "the result of X is".  Obviously, at least one
candidate is a possible winner.
----
D- For about the 15th time, I mention that mere number voting (i.e. relative 
ranking) does NOT show any approval of any choice.

Thus, I have suggested many times of having a YES/NO vote on any choice (for 
executive and judicial offices) along with number voting.  Thus, presumably, 
for  lower ranked choices, there is less acceptability (i.e. fewer YES votes 
for lower ranked choices).

Thus, for the single winner case --

YES Majorities

    0 -- Legislative body can fill any vacancy
   1  -- Elected
   2  or more -- go Head to Head

Head to Head

    1 defeats all -- Elected (Condorcet Winner)
    1 defeated by all others -- Loses (Condorcet Loser), recheck head to head 
math among the remaining choices
    0 beats each other -- Circular tie -- Worst defeated loses, recheck head 
to head math among the remaining choices.

Regarding the example--

IF (a big IF) ALL the votes for 1st or 2nd are YES votes, then
A 75, B 70, C 55.

Thus, assuming each choice in the above example has a YES majority , then

75 A/B 25
45 A/C 55
70 B/C 30

A>B>C>A

B has the largest relative loss.  C beats A.

The clone aspect of elections become more obvious if a choice D follows B in 
all cases. 

45 A B D C
25 B D C A
30 C A B D

D will have the same votes as B with respect to A and C.
However -- B, by definition, defeats D 100 to 0.

Such clone aspect arises from having divided majorities with choices of 
clones to vote for (and starts with the 3 choice circular tie case).

Condorcet seems to have noted the clone aspect of elections with his 
mentioning that it was more probable that large defeats are more likely 
correct than smaller defeats.

Playing the -- If there are such- and- such initial results, then "alter" the 
initial results -- game is commonly called stuffing the ballot box (as often 
happens with tyrannical corrupt and evil government leaders trying to 
maintain power and a major election felony in democratic governments).  

Democratic elections are held to have officers with some limited term of 
office.  There should be recall elections immediately possible for all 
offices to avoid powermadness in the elected officers after they take office 
(i.e. roughly 5-10 percent of the voters in the muddled middle routinely 
"alter" their minds at various elections).

I would suggest that ALL criteria are totally irrelevant to the average voter 
(except majority rule).