Erratum Re: [EM] (P1) and monotonicity for single-winner election systems and Condorcet.
David Catchpole
s349436 at student.uq.edu.au
Tue Oct 19 18:28:32 PDT 1999
Well, before Craig gets hyped up about the necessity of ignoring voters
who fail to vote in either "before" (V) or "after" (V') case, in order for
my definition of monotonicity to operate with meaning, I'll amend the
following-
> Let Pi(A,B:V) represent the truth of whether voter i prefers candidate A
> over B in voting schema V.
>
> Let W(V) represent the set of winners of voting schema V
>
> For all V, all V', W(V)<>W(V') implies-
>
> there exists i, A, B such that A is an element of W(V), A is not an
> element of W(V'), B is an element of W(V'), B is not an element of W(V),
> not Pi(B,A,V),not Pi(A,B,V')
to read-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let Pi(A,B:V) represent the truth of whether voter i prefers candidate A
over B in voting schema V.
Let W(V) represent the set of winners of voting schema V
For all V, all V', W(V)<>W(V') implies-
there exists i, A, B such that A is an element of W(V), A is not an
element of W(V'), B is an element of W(V'), B is not an element of
W(V), and-
(i) not Pi(B,A,V) and Pi(B,A,V')
or
(ii) Pi(A,B,V) and not Pi(A,B,V')
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There we go.
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