[EM] Re: Droop fails the Markus Schulze Rule

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

I note again that the following simple proxy p.r. method wastes a MIMIMAL 
number of votes and may have a quota of LESS THAN a Droop Quota ---

 (a) An Elector may vote for 1 or more legislative candidates on the ballots 
in a district (plus not more than [2] write-in votes) by voting “1”, “2” and 
so forth for his or her first, second and so forth choices. (b) If there are 
more than N candidates (or remaining candidates) in the district, then the 
candidate having the lowest number of votes shall be a losing candidate. (c) 
Each vote for a losing candidate shall be transferred to the Elector's next 
choice (if any) who is a remaining candidate in the district. (d) The 2 prior 
steps shall be repeated until there are N remaining candidates in the 
district who shall be elected. (e) A lottery shall be held if tie votes occur 
in any step. (f) Each member of a legislative body (or his or her 
replacement) shall have a voting power in the legislative body and its 
committees, in person or by written proxy, equal to the votes that the member 
finally receives in the Election. (g) Example- 5 to be elected
C = Candidates          Voting Power
C1  21          = 21 +   1   = 22
C2  20          = 20 +   5   = 25
C3  15          = 15 +   3   = 18
C4  12 + 5    = 17           = 17
C5  12 + 1    = 13 - 13   =   0
C6  11 + 3    = 14 +   2   = 16
C7   9  - 9     =   0          =   0
VNT 0            =   0 +   2  =   2
    100            100           100
   C7 Loses   C5 Loses
VNT= Votes not transferred

I suggest that N be at least 5 to avoid overly strong parties . The extreme 
case for winners.votes would obviously be 96, 1, 1, 1, 1 (i.e. quota =1).

However, I would expect in real elections that the last winner would get 
about 80 percent of a Droop Quota (otherwise the larger groups might split).

The fixation/obsession that each legislator must have 1 vote in a legislative 
body is the problem.   I note that many corporations have proxy voting 
(requireed by law in many jurisdictions) wherein an agent of the corporation 
shareholders has a voting power in shareholder meetings equal to the number 
of proxy shares he/she has.

I repeat, a legislator is the agent of the electors who votes for him or her 
(since the electors cannot meet in person generally - especially when there 
are a large number of electors).