[EM] Non-problems of PR-squared

Wed Jul 14 02:05:02 PDT 1999

Tom Round writes below, in criticism of PR-Squared and similar systems
(http://www.jdawiseman.com/papers/electsys.html):

*** "main objection to PR-cubed is that the result would depend so very
heavily on coalition deals (formal or informal) negotiated by the party
leadership long before election day"

Well, yes, and jolly good thing too. All parties are a coalition of
policies, and voters do not choose those policies, they choose between
parties (and between candidates). If there's a Red:Blue:Yellow split of the
votes of 45%:35%:20%, and the Blues and Yellows can form an alliance that
the electorate will deem viable, they should do so. That's the purpose of a
majoritarian system: it keeps power at the ballot box, rather than allowing
it to be moved to the post-election negotiating table (cf New Zealand, for a
topical example). However, that doesn't mean that B&Y can willy-nilly get
into bed together: in 1983 the UK electorate rejected the
Communist-Socialist alliance called Labour, and in 1997 rejected the
Americanophile-Europhile alliance called the Conservative Party. In
practice, a Blue-Yellow alliance would have exhausted itself squabbling over
policy (deep disagreements exist about Europe, defence and taxation, which
is plenty enough to cause argument), and thus would have hemorrhaged votes
to any other viable would-be government (the Reds). 

*** "It matters not that the electoral rules might _say_, on paper, that
explicit "joinder" or apparentement of lists, European-style, is not
allowed."

Agreed, joinder of lists would be allowed, subject to the rule that each
party can field at most one candidate in each constituency. (As in
http://www.jdawiseman.com/papers/electsys/pr2-uk.html)

*** "Both plurality and PR-cubed, however, share the defect that the voters
have no control over these coalitions or pacts -- ironically, exactly the
same accusation that plurality's defenders throw at PR systems."

This is the guts of our disagreement. Voters _do_ have control under
PR-Squared. Because these coalitions are formed _before_ the election,
voters have a chance to reject non-viable or artificial coalitions. Indeed,
coalitions of parties will function like large or 'broad' parties. In
non-majoritarian systems, voters choose parties, and then parties negotiate.
What surfaces can be related only distantly to pre-election intentions. In
contrast, PR-Squared creates an incentive ("So great are the incentives...")
to form coalitions that are visible to the voter. 

*** "Round's law for predicting a party's choice of preferred electoral
system: '1. Every party will advocate whichever electoral system will give
it the most seats for its expected number of votes in the foreseeable
future. ...' "

Not so, according to the Economist, which described both the Conservative
and Labour party submissions to the Jenkins Commission
(http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4090/volume-2/ppf-02.PDF
and
http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4090/volume-2/ppf-01.PDF)
as being principled and against the parties' self-interest. 

Julian Wiseman, http://www.jdawiseman.com

> -----Original Message-----
> From:	Tom Round [SMTP:T.Round at mailbox.gu.edu.au]
> Sent:	Wednesday, July 14, 1999 6:28 AM
> To:	Julian Wiseman
> Cc:	FairVote at compuserve.com; ban at igc.apc.org;
> elections-reform at igc.apc.org; civic-values at civic.net;
> canada-votes at egroups.com; election-methods-list at eskimo.com
> Subject:	[EM] Problems of PR-squared/ cubed/ etc systems
> 
> The "third way" (excuse pun) option of combining a party-list system of
> voting with -
> 
> [a]	a distribution of seats that's proportional to the cube (or square,
> or
> some other specified power) of each party's vote tally, and/or
> 
> [b]	candidates voted for, and elected, one per party list in each
> district,
> 
> - has been proposed before. I think it was Arend Lijphart in the early
> 1980s who quoted Dutch proposals to cube each party list's vote tally
> before allocating seats. And the method used for the Danish Folketing
> seeks
> to ensure as far as possible that each candidate elected from a party list
> has his/her "own" local constituency.
> 
> Political scientists from David Butler onwards have noted the "cube rule"
> effect of simple plurality voting, which explains why normally the party
> with most votes, if facing a divided opposition, will win an absolute
> majority of seats unless its vote is very low and the second and
> third-placed parties are both fairly close to it (eg, UK 1974). Thus the
> attraction of schemes that will institutionalise this result consistently,
> without the risk that the plurality party will win fewer seats than the
> runner up (as also occurred in 1974).
> 
> My main objection to PR-cubed is that the result would depend so very
> heavily on coalition deals (formal or informal) negotiated by the party
> leadership long before election day. Thus, if the votes go Red 45%, Blue
> 35%, Green 20%, and these parties run separate lists, the seats will be
> divided in the proportions 91,125 to 42,875 to 8,000, ie Red 64.17%, Blue
> 30.19%, Green 5.6%.
> 
> But if before the election Blue and Green agree to run a joint list, they
> will have a combined 55% of the vote and this will mean the seats are now
> divided in the proportion 91,125 to 166,375, so the seats will now go
> 35.38% to Red, 64.61% to the Blue/ Green alliance. Thus, without a single
> voter changing his/her voting preference, Red has been reduced from 2/3 to
> 1/3 of the seats (given voting patterns not all that different from, say,
> the 1983, 1987 and 1992 UK House of Commons elections). The result would
> be
> similar, although more moderate, if the vote totals were squared instead
> of
> cubed.
> 
> It matters not that the electoral rules might _say_, on paper, that
> explicit "joinder" or apparentement of lists, European-style, is not
> allowed. So great are the incentives for Blue and Green to unite and turn
> electoral annihilation into a landslide for them that they could still no
> doubt easily agree on a single joint list (doing so would yield them so
> many extra seats that they could easily afford to be magnanimous to each
> other). Unlike simple plurality, PR-cubed would not even require the party
> leaders to persuade their local party branches, activists and candidates
> to
> agree to stand down before they could make an electoral pact stick.
> 
> Both plurality and PR-cubed, however, share the defect that the voters
> have
> no control over these coalitions or pacts -- ironically, exactly the same
> accusation that plurality's defenders throw at PR systems. Mirroring the
> anti-PR charge that PR encourages coalitions negotiated in smoke-filled
> rooms after the votes are cast (which means voters can't cast a free and
> informed vote to ratify them) is the brute fact that any system which
> swings seats so violently back and forth (depending on whether 55% of
> votes
> go to one party or two) will conversely encourage coalitions negotiated in
> smoke-filled rooms before the votes are cast, which means voters can't
> cast
> a free and informed vote to ratify them either. It is a fallacy to boast,
> as many do, that plurality systems discourage coalitions. All they do is
> discourage coalitions which offer voters a choice of candidates or
> parties.
> All PR systems at least do the latter. [I expound on this in more length
> in
> "A Matter of Preference?", available at
> http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~lee/prsa/tround/ -- my opinion on this matter has
> not changed since 1992.]
> 
> Single Transferable Vote PR systems, which I support, have the further
> advantage that they mean the final, "marginal" seat in each electorate is
> almost always decided by inter-party preference flows while the earlier
> seats are almost all won by parties on their own votes. Thus, STV-PR both
> (a) encourages party leaders to negotiate their coalition deal before
> election day -- otherwise their supporters' preferences will "leak" and
> they may lose crucial seats they could otherwise have won. But it also (b)
> allows voters to decide whether or not to reject that advice.
> 
> I would also respectfully query whether, as Julian says, single-member
> plurality "has served two countries well for centuries". Firstly, if the
> second country is the USA, I would suggest that the plurality system works
> in the USA almost the opposite to the UK -- primary elections, fixed
> terms,
> a separate presidential executive, and party-block ballots for multiple
> offices have produced a very loose, undisciplined US party system behind
> the nominal Republican/ Democrat divide. Secondly, plurality was used in
> multi-seat electorates -- even for national elections -- in both USA and
> UK
> until only about a century ago.
> 
> Deliberate gerrymandering by politicians can be avoided if you use a
> boundary commission, but even with impartial drawing single-member
> boundaries can still produce weird results (eg, giving victory to the
> runner-up party in two of the last four Australian House of Reps
> elections).
> 
> I cannot comment on Julian's assessment of PM Blair's motivations for
> supporting the change, except to note that almost all politicians support
> particular systems for reasons of party advantage, so the motivation game
> is little help in deciding which system gives voters the best deal.
> 
> Round's law for predicting a party's choice of preferred electoral system:
> "1. Every party will advocate whichever electoral system will give it the
> most seats for its expected number of votes in the foreseeable future. 2.
> Corollary: It will therefore advocate the system that gives it the most
> seats for its expected share of votes, excluding any system that has a
> bias
> so blatant and hard to justify that ordinary voters will lose faith in
> that
> party and thus give it fewer seats -- due to loss of votes -- than it
> gains
> due to the workings of a favourable electoral method." Works every time!
> 
> At 10:14 AM 7/5/99 +0100, you wrote:
> >Just for the record, many people (myself included) do not believe that
> >single-member plurality is "ANTI-DEMOCRATIC", whether whispered or
> shouted.
> >Majoritarian systems prevent power being passed from the ballot box to
> the
> >negotiating table; and simple systems are widely understood and provide a
> >clear link from constituent to representative. Whilst I don't believe SMP
> is
> >optimal (my preference can be found via
> >http://www.jdawiseman.com/papers/electsys.html), SMP is far from
> pessimal,
> >and has served two countries well for centuries. Gerrymandering can be
> >avoided by depoliticising boundary commissions (as in the UK); and
> elections
> >can be made fairer by capping campaign spending (perhaps a more
> complicated
> >constitutional change).
> 
> >If the UK switches, it is for domestic political reasons entailing a
> split
> >in the Labour Party and an alliance of the right of that with the Liberal
> >Democrats. Any Prime Minister who spends the taxpayers' cash on
> supporting
> >his side of a referendum campaign (in a word, cheating) has motivations
> >other than democracy itself. (And as for his attempt to impose a
> Hindenburg
> >solution on Northern Ireland by allowing a private army to take power,
> >please don't ask how that is pro-democratic.)
> 
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From:	DEMOREP1 at aol.com [SMTP:DEMOREP1 at aol.com]
> >> Sent:	Monday, July 05, 1999 12:57 AM
> >> To:	FairVote at compuserve.com; ban at igc.apc.org;
> >> elections-reform at igc.apc.org; civic-values at civic.net;
> >> canada-votes at egroups.com; election-methods-list at eskimo.com
> >> Subject:	[EM] U.K. Voting Systems, 3rd edition
> 
> >> The below Research Paper pdf file shows how primitive (i.e. in the
> >> political
> >> barbarian Dark Ages) the ANTI-DEMOCRATIC plurality- single member
> district
> 
> >> gerrymander system is for electing legislative bodies in Canada, India,
> >> U.K.
> >> and the USA and any other similar areas.
> >> -------
> >> http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98.htm
> >> has a link to----
> >> -------------
> >> [U.K. House of Commons Library]
> 
> >> RESEARCH PAPER 98/113
> >> 14 DECEMBER 1998
> 
> >> Voting Systems - The Government's Proposals (3rd revised edition)
> 
> >> [Summary]
> 
> >> This Paper seeks to draw together the Government's proposals for new
> >> systems
> >> of voting for the European Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the
> Welsh
> >> National Assembly, the new Northern Ireland Assembly and the Greater
> >> London
> >> Authority. It discusses common themes related to those elections. It
> also
> >> summarises the proposals of the Jenkins Commission which has
> recommended
> >> an
> >> alternative system to First Past the Post so that a referendum can be
> held
> 
> >> during the lifetime of this Parliament on a new voting system for the
> >> House
> >> of Commons. Finally the possibility of a new voting system for local
> >> government is briefly discussed. This Paper replaces Research Paper
> 98/80.
> 
> >> More detailed consideration of voting systems is given in Research
> Paper
> >> 98/112 Voting Systems: The Jenkins Report. This Paper is designed so
> that
> >> each section can be used separately as a guide to the voting procedures
> of
> 
> >> the relevant institution, and so there is an unavoidable element of
> >> repetition.
> 
> >> Oonagh Gay
> >> HOME AFFAIRS SECTION
> >> Bryn Morgan
> >> SOCIAL AND GENERAL STATISTICS SECTION
> >> HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY
> 
> >> --- Summary of main points
> 
> >> The Government introduced Bills in the 1997-8 Session to create new
> >> voting
> >> systems for the European Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales
> and
> >> the
> >> Scottish Parliament. There are some common themes which are explored
> >> briefly
> >> in the introduction to this Paper. A closed list system is intended for
> >> the
> >> European Parliament and for the additional member aspect of the
> Additional
> 
> >> Member System (AMS) proposed for the National Assembly and the Scottish
> >> Parliament. In effect electors vote for a party rather than an
> individual
> >> candidate. Greater attention focuses on party candidate selection
> >> procedures,
> >> and all the major parties have been reviewing their systems for the new
> >> types
> >> of elections expected in 1999. The role of MEPs, and members of the
> >> National
> >> Assembly for Wales, and the Scottish Parliament may undergo review
> >> following
> >> the introduction of party lists. In addition legislation to create the
> new
> 
> >> Northern Ireland Assembly has meant that another form of PR, the Single
> >> Transferable Vote, is being used for a devolved assembly in that
> province.
> >> At
> >> Second Reading of the European Parliamentary Election Bill, the Home
> >> Secretary promised to review the possibility of an open list system on
> the
> 
> >> Belgian model, but a final decision was announced before Commons Report
> >> stage
> >> that the closed list system would be used. 84 MEPs will be elected
> under a
> 
> >> Regional List System. Scotland and Wales will form one single electoral
> >> system each, and England will be divided into nine regions, each with
> >> between
> >> 4-11 MEPs. Single Transferable Vote (STV) for Northern Ireland is
> >> preserved.
> >> The Bill was finally lost after the Commons and Lords could not agree
> on
> >> closed and open lists. A new Bill has been introduced, which is
> identical
> >> to
> >> the 1997-8 one and which is discussed in Research Paper 98/102 The
> >> European
> >> Parliamentary Elections Bill The Additional Member System is planned
> for
> >> elections to the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Assembly.
> >> The
> >> elector has two votes, one for a constituency MP and one for an
> additional
> 
> >> member selected from party lists for a electoral region. In Wales there
> >> will
> >> be 40 constituency members and 20 additional members. In Scotland there
> >> will
> >> be 73 constituency members and 56 additional members. At present closed
> >> lists
> >> will operate for the Additional Member aspect and the Government has no
> >> plans
> >> to introduce open lists. In Northern Ireland 108 Members, 6 for each
> >> Parliamentary constituency, have been elected using STV. The Greater
> >> London
> >> Authority Bill is expected to have its second reading on 14 and 15
> >> December
> >> 1998. It will introduce an AMS system for the elections of Assembly
> >> members
> >> and Supplementary Vote (SV) will be used for the election of a Mayor
> for
> >> London. Elections are expected in May 2000. The Government promised in
> its
> 
> >> manifesto for the 1997 election that it would set up an independent
> >> commission to recommend an appropriate proportional voting system to
> First
> 
> >> Past the Post (FPTP) for the House of Commons. A referendum would then
> be
> >> held to allow voters a choice between the two systems. An independent
> >> commission under Lord Jenkins was announced in December 1997, and
> reported
> >> in
> >> October 1998. It proposed a version of AMS, using the Alternative Vote
> in
> >> the
> >> constituency element and with 15-20 per cent of the seats elected on an
> >> open
> >> list system, to be known as Top-up Members. It is not yet clear when
> the
> >> referendum will be held. Further detail on the Jenkins report is given
> in
> >> Research Paper 98/112 Voting Systems: The Jenkins Report.
> 
> >> Related Library Research Papers include:
> 
> >> 98/118 The Greater London Authority Bill: Electoral and Constitutional
> >> 11.12.98
> >> Aspects Bill 7 of 1998-99
> >> 98/115 The Greater London Authority Bill [Bill 7 of 1998-9] 11.12.98
> >> 98/112 Voting Systems: The Jenkins Report 09.12.98
> >> 98/102 The European Parliamentary Elections Bill [Bill 4 of 1998-9]
> >> 01.12.98
> >> 98/76 The Northern Ireland Bill: Implementing the Belfast Agreement
> >> 20.07.98
> >> [Bill No 229]
> >> 98/62 The Registration of Political Parties Bill [Bill 188 of 1997-8]
> >> 01.06.98
> >> 98/57 Northern Ireland: Political Developments since 1972 11.05.98
> >> 98/1 The Scotland Bill: Devolution and Scotland's Parliament 07.01.98
> >> 97/129 The Government of Wales Bill: Devolution and the National
> 04.12.97
> >> Assembly
> >> 97/120 The European Parliamentary Elections Bill [Bill 65 of 1997-98]
> >> 19.11.97
> >> 97/114 The Greater London Authority (Referendum) Bill 06.11.97
> >> [Bill 61 of 1997-98]
> >> ----
> >> The below 1999 reports continue the above-- at
> 
> >> http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99.htm
> 
> >> 99/64 Elections to the European Parliament - June 1999 18. 06. 99
> 
> >> 99/57 European Parliament Elections - 1979 to 1994 02. 06. 99
> 
> >> 99/54 Institutional Reform in the European Union 20. 05. 99
> 
> >> 99/52 The Local Elections of 6 May 1999 11. 05. 99
> 
> >> 99/51 Welsh Assembly Elections: 6 May 1999 11. 05. 99
> 
> >> 99/50 Scottish Parliament Elections: 6 May 1999 11. 05. 99
> 
> >> 99/46 Local Elections - Proposals for Reform 28. 04. 99
> 
> >> 99/7 The House of Lords Bill: Lords reform and wider constitutional
> reform
> 
> >> [Bill 34 of 1998-99] 28. 01. 99
> 
> >> 99/6 The House of Lords Bill : Options for "Stage Two" [Bill 34 of
> >> 1998-99]
> >> 28. 01. 99
> 
> >> 99/5 The House of Lords Bill :"Stage One" Issues [Bill 34 of
> 1998-99]28.
> >> 01.
> >> 99
> 
> =============================================================
> Tom Round
> BA (Hons), LL.B (Qld)
> [1] Research Officer, Key Centre for Law, Ethics, Justice and Governance
> (incorporating the National Institute for Law, Ethics and Public Affairs),
> and
> [2] Associate Lecturer, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice,
> Griffith University, Queensland [Australia] 4111
> Ph:	[1] 07 3875 3817 or [2]  07 3875 6671 or [3] 07 3875 5957
> Fax:	[1] 07 3875 6634 or [2] 07 3875 5608
> E-mail: 	T.Round at mailbox.gu.edu.au
> Web:	http://www.gu.edu.au/school/ccj/
> =============================================================