Condorcet Reversed

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

To help reduce Mr. Davidson's continuous ravings about the Condorcet method he
might wish to consider the case of reversing the election process-- namely
about defeating candidates.

Example- Single office, 6 candidates, 5 to be elected, 1 to be defeated

Guess which one should be defeated.


Answer--- the candidate who is beat by each of the other candidates head to
head.
If there is a tie case (each candidate can beat or tie at least 1 other
candidate head to head), then the candidate with the earliest/ highest
majority against him/her should lose.

Reverse the process and one gets the regular Condorcet case for a single
office.

Anti-Condorcet folks such as Mr. Davidson (along with Instant run-off (IRO)
folks) somehow find it impossible to believe that (a) there can be a Condorcet
winner who beats each other choice head to head or (b) highest majorities
should eliminate losing candidates if and when there is no Condorcet winner.

In other words the place votes tables does not exist according to such folks.

          Votes in each place
      1      2      3     4   etc.
A    A1     A2     A3    A4   etc.
B    B1     B2     B3    B4   etc.
C    C1     C2     C3    C4   etc.
D    D1     D2     D3    D4   etc.
etc etc    etc     etc   etc  etc.

I mention again for new folks that the Condorcet (Head to Head) standard using
number voting (N test winning choice(s) versus 1 test losing choice with the
other choices being assumed losers) applies to ALL elections--

(a) multi-seat legislative bodies (N seats with 1 effective vote)
(b) single seat executive or judicial offices (1 seat with 1 effective vote)
(c) multi-seat executive or judicial offices (such as 3 sheriffs or judges) (N
seats with N effective votes).

I mention again that for executive and judicial offices there should also be
an approval vote (since number voting does NOT show approval-- all candidates
might be unacceptable to some voters).