(P1) defined

[David Catchpole]

The question may well become one of asking whether the addition of clones
should help or harm their side. In the interests of participation, I
addition (removal) should not harm (help) the side. This is the basis
behind the "no splitting" rules I put up in the dim distant past. (Note,
Craig- they're not regularity, and they're certainly not
placed in a probabilistic formalism, so yes, you
can apply a deterministic approach to them).

On Thu, 16 Dec 1999 DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:

> Mr. Carey wrote-
> 
> I can't imagine proponents of STV finding a lot of merit in the
>  "clones" ideas  that paird of two preferences have the same order
>  or both are reversed but it is not that case that one is permuted
>  and the other isn't. 
> ---
> D- In my earlier Re: FPTP family theory, REDLOG shadowing posting, I wrote in 
> part-
> 
> Adding D-- a 100 percent clone of B
> 
> 34 A>B>D>C
> 33 B>D>C>A
> 32 C>A>B>D
> 
> A>B>D>C>A
> 
> [99 B > 0 D]
> ----- 
> In reality land some folks will likely rank D before B (especially Voter D 
> and his/her friends and relatives !!!).  
> 
> Thus the clone range will be-- 
> 
> All voters for choice X > 0 voters for choice Y to--
> Bare majority of total voters for choice X > largest minority of total voters 
> for choice Y (with a possible tie with an even number of voters).
> 
> There is some probability math near the tie case-- but "majority rule" is a 
> rather elementary criteria.   Larger majorities are more probably "correct" 
> than smaller majorities (as observed by Condorcet some 210 years ago).
> 
> Even in the Total Voters X > 0 Y case, one cannot tell by simple number 
> ranking whether or not the Y choice is a copy of the X choice (with a minor 
> style difference) or a major opposite of the X choice.  
> 
> As I have mentioned many times, number rank voting does not show approval of 
> any choice.   A second intensity vote is necessary such as-- a plus 100 
> percent to minus 100 percent scale vote on each choice by each voter or a 
> simple YES or NO vote on each choice (along with the number rank voting).
> 
> 

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Nothing is foolproof given a talented fool.