[EM] Salva Voting - a single winner method

[Ron Tannenwald]

>Greetings list,
>
>    Salva has sent more information.
>
>Donald
>  ------------- Forwarded Letter --------------
>From:  Salva
>To: "Donald E Davison" <donald at mich.com>
>Subject: Re: What do you call it?
>Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 21:23:02 +0200
>
>In the method I intended to describe there was no remaining seats. Let's
>suppose a 100 seat parliament. After the first count on the first choice of
>every ballot ALL 100 seats have been allocated. The ballots that have not
>obtained representation are re-counted on their second choice and
>transfered. Now the allocation in done again in all 100 seats, giving
>(though not necessarily) a new picture to these 100 seats. The proces goes
>on giving every time (not necessarily) a new picture of the parliament,
>until the end of the process. The last picture of the parliament is the
>definitive outcome of the election. (in practice the last and definitive one
>differs little from the first and provisional one).
>
>- - - - - - - - - - - comments by Donald - - - - - - - - - -
>Dear list,
>
>     Salva's method seems to be a form of Approval Voting. A form that uses
>the lower choices of only the ballots that are not in the tally of the
>first 100 candidates.
>
>     I feel that Salva is on to something with this method. Therefore I am
>going to call it Salva Voting - being as no one has claimed another name
>for the method.
>
>     Salva did not state if the 100 member parliament were elected via
>single seat districts or in an One Area Election, but it appears the math
>would work in either. And because the method will function in a single seat
>district, this also makes Salva Voting a single winner method.
>
>     Salva Voting has a number of good points:
>
>     1) Salva Voting will always confirm the majority winner if we have one
>on the first count of the ballots. Approval Voting will not always confirm
>the majority winner.
>     2) The lower choices do not help defeat the first choice.
>     3) Salva Voting does not eliminate candidates.
>     4) Salva Voting will never end up in a circular tie.
>
>     Those of you that are more interested in single winner methods should
>examine Salva Voting. It may be the best single winner method.
>
>Regards,
>Donald

Donald!

      Consider the following election situation with 4 candidates for a single
position.


     49%      25%      26%
    _____     ____     ____

      A        B         C
      B        C         B
               D         D


    Method     Winner
  ________    _______

  plurality      A

  with runoff    C

  Borda	         B

  Condorcet      B

  approval       B

  Hare           C

  Salva          D ??

       If I understand this idea, it isn't even Paretto much less monotonic!

   Respectfully,

Ronald Tannenwald
Chairperson, Mathematics Department
UMass Dartmouth
North Dartmouth MA, 02747
(508) 999-8746
Fax: 508-910-6917