[EM] Reply to DEMOREP on Lord Jenkin's Proposals

New Democracy donald at mich.com
Mon Sep 28 03:15:47 PDT 1998


Jenkin's Proposal: AV Plus is a hybrid of two separate voting methods. "AV"
(Alternative Vote) is a system of electing MPs for constituencies, the
"Plus" is a system of topping-up from a list to achieve something nearer

>DEMOREP: *something nearer* is a fraud when exact methods exist such that X
>percentage of votes directly produces X percentage of the seats (or to be
>totally exact, exactly X percentage of the voting power in the legislative

Donald: No, it is not a fraud. Topping-up will produce the exact
proportionality for political parties as if Choice Voting(STV) were used in
a single area election. (But, only for political parties).
     I would like you to be aware of the beauty of the Choice for Party
added to the vote in a district. The beauty of the Choice for Party is that
it will offset any and all flaws of any method and/or features used in the
districts. Use FPTP or Run-Off or STV or Apporval or Condorcet - add in
some Gerrymandering, the Choice For Party will still produce the same
proportionality for political party. So, you see it does not really care
which method is used in the district as long as the people have the Choice
for Party added to the district vote.

>DEMOREP: Having closed lists is another fraud with party elites controling
>the names on the ballots.

Donald: True, I agree with you on this point. I prefer open lists. With
open lists the voters of a party would be able to influence the course of
their party by their power to select the order of their candidates on the
party list. Also, open lists would improve the proportionality for other
reasons, like gender, race, or whatever.

>DEMOREP: This [Alternative Vote] is the infamous so-called instant
>run-off(IRO) method with its well known defect of being able to NOT
>choose a compromise candidate.  Example:  45 AC  40 BC  11 CB  4 CA
>C loses using IRO. B wins.

Donald: First let me say that this run-off routine was going by the name of
Alternative Vote long before the Center for Voting and Democracy(CV&D)
coined the term Instant Run-Off. By the way, allow me to bring you up to
date, CV&D now calls it Instant Run-Off Voting, with the letters IRV
instead of IRO. (I know - minor detail) I prefer to call it Choice Run-Off.

     It is true that with Choice Run-Off as the method, Candidate C will
lose, but it can be argued that candidate C does not deserve to win.
Consider that 85 percent of the voters voted for someone else as their
first preferred choice. The voters of candidate C do have the power to
decide which of the two front runners will be the winner. The C voters are
in the position of being the "King Maker".

>DEMOREP: However, head to head C beats A 55 to 45 and C beats B 60 to 40.
>The proper method for a single winner is the Condorcet method that compares
>each pair of candidates head to head. If one candidate wins all of his/her
>pairings he/she is a Condorcet winner.   If there is no such candidate, then
>a tiebreaker can be used.

Donald: Wow, two different winners, with two different methods, using the
same example. They both cannot be the real winner. Which one is correct?
Will the real winner please stand up.
     What factor or data was used in one method and not in the other? I see
now, the reason we have different winners is because the second choices of
the voters of candidate A and B were used in the Condorcet method and not
used in the Run-Off method. In other words the second choices of 85 percent
of the voters were used to help defeat their first and most preferred
choices. Condorcet was able to fool the voters - it is not nice to fool the
voters - they will react by not making any lower choices in the future.
When they do stop, it is good bye Condorcet, because Condorcet needs lower
choices in order to steal the election for the third place candidate. It is
not to the advantage of the voters to make lower choices in a Condorcet
method election - while it is to the advantage of the voters to make lower
choices in a Run-Off type of an election.
     Because most of the voters may not make lower choices means that
Condorcet has a flaw, but that is not the only flaw of Condorcet - the
Circular Tie is another major flaw of the Condorcet method. By your own
research, one out of three Condorcet elections will end up in a circular
tie. After we have a tie there is nothing we can do to show which candidate
is the real winner and to show that that candidate has a majority of the
votes in use. A circular tie breaker is no better than drawing straws.

DEMOREP: >I will estimate in advance that the current circa 20 percent
>minority rule to elect a bare majority of the members of the
>UK Parliament will go up to about 35 percent minority rule with AV plus.

Donald: No, 35 is low. I say 50+, if they do not use an artificial
threshold. About 45+ if they use the same threshold as New Zealand - which
causes about ten percent of the votes to be wasted. This leaves 90 percent,
and it follows that 50+ control of 90 is 45+.

Donald: In closing I would like to question your example. I have seen these
kind of examples posted many times by Pairwise Guys.
     Example:  45 AC  40 BC  11 CB  4 CA   Is this one of Mike O's examples?
     You should be aware that this is a concocted example. Voters would
never vote like this in a real election in the real world. Notice that the
85 voters of candidate A and B have marched lockstep and selected candidate
C as every one of their second choices. This is unbeliveable - this would
never happen. Notice that this example gives candidate C a total of 100
first and second choices. No candidate would ever recieve a choice from
every single voter. Notice that while candidate C got 100 choices,
candidate A only received 49 and candidate B only received 51. A very
slanted example. Notice that while the votes of candidate C is divided into
two parts the votes of candidates A and B are not divided at all. More
deception. People do not vote like this. I will show you how people vote:

        ___ A           ___ B           ___ C
        ___ AB          ___ BA          ___ CA
        ___ AC          ___ BC          ___ CB
        ___ ABC         ___ BAC         ___ CAB
        ___ ACB         ___ BCA         ___ CBA
       --------         -------         -------
         45              40              15                     em

     This is how people vote, they are going to vote 15 different
combinations of candidates for a three candidate race. You can fill in the
blanks with random numbers to give the same totals for A, B, and C of 45,
40, and 15. Once that is done, you will have a realistic example. Now maybe
Condorcet will improve by having less circular ties and by having the same
winner as the "Choice Run-Off Winner".

     Do not let the Pairwise Guys influence you. They have an agenda. Their
game plan is to get some single seat method installed that will allow them,
by hook or by crook, to win seats for their third party candidates in
single seat districts electing lawmakers. Their method of choice is
Condorcet - a good hook.

Donald Davison

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