part 3, cat dragged in reply

Mike Ositoff ntk at netcom.com
Mon Oct 19 00:57:29 PDT 1998


> 
> Donald wrote:
> > > [deleted]
> > >      Approval has another major flaw. Your second choice will be used to
> > > help defeat your first and most preferred choice.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff wrote:
> 
> > Only if you vote for it when you didn't need to, and sufficiently
> > many other people do. But IRO has the same problem, if you try
> > to help a candidate that you mistakenly believe that you need in
> > order to beat someone worse, by insincerely ranking that compromise
> > 1st. The difference, as I said before, is that Approval, compared
> > to IRO, needs twice as many suckers to give away an election. And
> > with Approval, it doesn't happen at equilibrium, though it can
> > with IRO & Plurality. [...]
> 
> Are they suckers when you really do need the compromise candidate?  If

No. They're suckers if they believe they need the compromise
candidate, & therefore give the election away to him when their
own candidate would have otherwise won.

> you want to make it easier to elect a compromise candidate when needed,
> it will also be easier to elect the compromise when not needed. 

When voting for a compromise over someone worse, you shouldn't have
to also vote for him over your favorite. It's one thing to help
elect the compromise vs someone worse. In IRO when you do that
you also help elect him vs your favorite. Not in Approval.

> Besides, Approval may need twice as many suckers, but it should be much
> easier to find those suckers when they don't have to make a conscious
> decision to help a compromise candidate at the expense of their
> favorite.  At least with IRO it requires a conscious decision, which
> would tend to be attractive only to someone with some data to support
> that decision.

Are you suggesting that Approval voters vote while unconscious?
Giving a vote to someone who isn't your favorite is a conscious
decision, which would tend to be attractive only to someone with some
data to support that decision. Just as with IRO. Difference:
number of suckers needed, and the fact that if they misjudge
& give away the election, that isn't an equilibrium.

> 
> 

Mike Ossipoff



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