part 3, cat dragged in reply

Bart Ingles bartman at
Mon Oct 19 00:29:35 PDT 1998

Donald wrote:
> > [deleted]
> >      Approval has another major flaw. Your second choice will be used to
> > help defeat your first and most preferred choice.

Mike Ossipoff wrote:

> Only if you vote for it when you didn't need to, and sufficiently
> many other people do. But IRO has the same problem, if you try
> to help a candidate that you mistakenly believe that you need in
> order to beat someone worse, by insincerely ranking that compromise
> 1st. The difference, as I said before, is that Approval, compared
> to IRO, needs twice as many suckers to give away an election. And
> with Approval, it doesn't happen at equilibrium, though it can
> with IRO & Plurality. [...]

Are they suckers when you really do need the compromise candidate?  If
you want to make it easier to elect a compromise candidate when needed,
it will also be easier to elect the compromise when not needed. 
Besides, Approval may need twice as many suckers, but it should be much
easier to find those suckers when they don't have to make a conscious
decision to help a compromise candidate at the expense of their
favorite.  At least with IRO it requires a conscious decision, which
would tend to be attractive only to someone with some data to support
that decision.

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