Meta election final list.

Mike Ositoff ntk at
Sat Oct 10 14:52:03 PDT 1998


Bart wrote:

> Mike Osipoff:
> > Absolutely, publish the raw data & discuss it directly. But
> > also why not count it by Plurality & by whichever pairwise coulnt
> > that you like, & report the result.
> No real objection, just that some of the goals seem to stand on their
> own as requirements & don't really conflict with anything else.  Trying
> to rank them seems a little like re-ordering the Boy Scout Law
> (trustworthy, loyal, helpful...)    :-]
> I guess ranking could help decide which goals can be considered
> requirements, and which are merely desireable criteria to be ranked.  A
> requirement would have to be (1) Achievable, (2) not in conflict with
> any other requirement, and (3) more important than any non-requirement. 
> Because of (2), it would not be necessary to rank requirements in
> relation to one another, but all would be ranked higher than other
> goals.

Requirements can be & are in conflict with other requirements, and
so it's important to rank them, so as to get an idea of which beats
which pairwise. And if there were 3 or more conflicting requirements
or desiderata, then of course the various rank-counts could
bew of value. One person's requirement is another person's
optional desideratum, and, to someone else, may be of no
interest at all.

Don's procedural requirements are in conflict with all or nearly
all of the goals, principles & requirements that relate to results.
But if those procedural requirements are important to Don, then
he'd of course be right to conduct votes by his method, or even
propose IRO in his town, or anywhere else, if he believes that
he can convince others that the various results requirements
aren't important.

Wanting to use the count to choose based on the probability
that the various pairwise propositions are true is in conflict
with majority rule, where "majority" is used in its usual sense
of a majority of everyone taking part in the vote.

Since, with Schulze's method, increasing someone's defeat could
increase the weakest defeat in your favorite's strongest beat
path, Blakes requirement or desideratum about risk-free offensive
strategy when nothing is known about other voters isn't in
conflict with the VA advantages.

But it does conflict with a combination of VA advantages &
simplicity, most likely. In any case, though, Schulze(VA)
has the VA advantages that Margins doesn't have, while
not having the problem that Blake described, and so that
VA method dominates Margins when it comes to strategy



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