Approval/Plurality combinations

[Bart Ingles]

Minor correction:

Bart Ingles wrote:

Was:
> [deleted]
> As for the second defect, I don't think any method can guarantee a
> majority of sincere votes.  For example, your Condorcet-Approval method

Should be:
As for the second defect, I don't think any method can guarantee a
majority comprised of only sincere votes...

> would lack a majority whenever Approval does, unless I misunderstand the
> method.  The only way I know of to guarantee a majority of voters is to
> prohibit truncation and then treat all choices as a YES -- even though
> the voter disapproved of the lower choices and used random-fill to
> complete the ballot.  If you are going to add random votes to the
> totals, why not eliminate the uncertainty and just add a fixed amount to
> each total, and "decree" a majority?  I doubt that Approval would fail
> to yield a majority very often, but when it does I think the problem
> lies with the candidates and not with the method.

Sure you can always have a majority of some subset of the total vote,
but then you have a relative win and not an absolute majority.